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In this paper I examine the topic of earnings management and use a case example. In the first 
part of the paper I review theory on two closely related topics - earnings management and 
fraud - and present and discuss incentives, methods, typical indications and frequency of 
earnings management in the financial statements. I continue to describe the frameworks and 
laws that apply to revenue recognition and how income is recognized in the power industry, 
as this is especially relevant for the case. Further, I describe the auditor’s and the board of 
director’s responsibilities to detect fraud according to the law.  
 
The next part deals with one of the largest Nordic accounting scandals in recent years. In 2011 
it was discovered that a subsidiary of Troms Kraft had recorded fictitious revenues of 1.5 
billion over a period of 10 years. I examine the company’s financial statements in the years 
before the fraud was uncovered to evaluate if there are any indications of misstatements. 
Moreover, I analyze the company’s environment to identify factors that increased the risk of 
fraud, including motivations and opportunities of fraud. The aim of the analysis is to 
investigate how the company was able to record the fictitious revenues, by drawing upon 
established academic literature on earnings management and fraud.  
 
In the last part I will analyze which control mechanisms the company had in place, mainly 
focusing on the composition and quality of the board of directors and the auditor. This way I 
try to answer whether they performed their duties to prevent and discover fraud. By both 
considering the company’s specific risks and indications of earnings management, I will 
conclude on whether the control mechanisms were adequate and should have detected the 
fraud at an earlier point.  
 




PART I - INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem identification 
The annual report provides information on the company’s activities and financial performance 
in a year. This is important as the owners, having limited information on the company’s daily 
operations, base their decisions on this report. The management on the other hand, running the 
firm, has much more information. One problem with this separation of ownership and control 
is that the two parties might have different interests. While it is in the best interest of the 
owners to maximize firm value, management may focus on short term personal incentives, 
even though they have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the owners. 
 
When a firm performs poorly, managers can be tempted to use accounting as a way of 
improving business performance, for instance through exploiting the flexibility in the 
accounting rules. The manager can increase earnings by recording transactions too early or by 
postponing to record costs, even though this is not in accordance with the applicable 
accounting framework. There are many motives behind such actions, such as pressure to beat 
earnings expectations or incentives to maximize compensation. Moreover, as bonuses are 
often tied to performance, managers might feel tempted to maximize salary by managing 
earnings numbers. 
 
Earnings management is when managers or others in charge of preparing the financial 
statement manage the earnings or report numbers in the company by either exploiting the 
flexibility in the accounting rules, or by breaking them. The academic interest for the topic 
has increased in recent years, due to the many accounting scandals around the world. 
Internationally, companies like World Com, Enron, and most recently Lehman Brothers, 
managed to perform EM on a large scale. In Norway, we have examples of EM from the cases 
of FAST, Sponsorservice, Tordenskjold, Finance Credit and most recently Troms Kraft. All 
these companies managed to fool the market, even though control mechanisms such as 
accounting rules and auditors were in place to prevent and detect EM. What characterizes all 
these cases is the lack of information or wrongful information, stretching of accounting rules 
and intentional falsification of accounts. In most cases the fraud also concerned revenue 
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recognition. The reason is that revenues have a great effect on profits, and also because it is a 
complex area - making it difficult for external users to detect misstatements.  
 
The company’s governance mechanisms are the policies and procedures in place to control 
and protect the interests of the stakeholders (Thomsen & Conyon, 2011). In other words the 
mechanisms that reduces the possibility that management behaves opportunistically. Such 
mechanisms include the regulative framework, internal control routines, the board of directors 
and the auditor, which are all designed to prevent and detect misstatements in the financial 
statement. The auditor’s role and responsibility is to add reliability to the financial statements 
and to assure that they have been prepared in accordance with law and regulations and in 
accordance with accounting standards, principles and practices (Stuart, 2011). But as 
accounting rules are flexible, even within generally accepted practices, there are many 
opportunities to manage a company’s performance numbers. What is more, the reliability and 
relevance of information in the financial reports depend largely on management competence 
and integrity, as many estimates depend on their discretion and judgment. 
 
Since the board controls who is elected as top manager, they are responsible to judge the 
competence and integrity of this person. The board is also accountable that the financial 
statement is accurate and reflects the true financial position of the firm. In many accounting 
scandals, management was able to misstate financial statements over longer periods of time. 
In many cases, circumstances suggest that the board should have detected the fraud earlier. 
Some claim that board members generally are too busy, and do not have the necessary 
knowledge of the firm, while others argue they place too much trust in top management. 
 
In response to the many scandals, regulatory bodies such as the government and stock 
exchanges have increased their efforts to improve accounting standards, laws and 
enforcement actions. The most acknowledged is probably the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US, 
which was a result of the failure of Enron. The corporate failures in Norway and the rest of 
Europe have also resulted in increased regulation concerning board structure, independence 
and auditor work. However, this does not necessarily improve information in the financial 
statements or make it easier to detect misstatements as many items are based on 
management’s good judgment. This opens opportunities to manage earnings, and as outsiders 
and auditors have limited information to judge and control whether these numbers are correct 
- this represents a problem.   




1.2 Problem definition  
The reason I find the case of Troms Kraft interesting, is the magnitude of earnings 
management – it is referred to as the largest fraud in Nordic history by the Swedish Economic 
Fraud Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten). Troms Kraft estimate that the misstatements that 
was uncovered in 2011, started already in 2002. The misstatements are estimated to amount to 
around 1.6 billion SEK, which the company had recorded as revenues. It is surprising that the 
management were able to deceive the owners for such a long time without anyone questioning 
the reliability of the numbers. To understand how the fraud could go on for such a long time, 
it is necessary to look at the company’s environment, as there are certain conditions that need 
to be present in a company in order for fraud to occur. These conditions include the 
company’s existing corporate governance mechanisms, pressures or incentives to meet 
earnings targets or a certain level of growth, and the values and integrity at the core of the 
company’s culture. As the manipulation occurred over many years, and constituted a 
considerable amount of revenues, it is questionable whether the governance mechanisms 
surrounding the company were effective. Consequently, the research question can be derived;  
Which conditions where present in the company that made the fraud possible?  
In order to answer this research question, I will analyze if available information could indicate 
misstatements or the possibility of misstatements. To see if there were any indications of 
fraud, I will analyze the trends and reasonableness of the numbers in the company’s financial 
statement. Hence, the first sub research question is; 
Are there any indications of misstatements in the financial statement numbers? 
After having analyzed the financial statement and environment in Kraft & Kultur I will 
investigate specifically how earnings were manipulated. This relates to the specific accrual 
and accounting methods used for earnings management. The next sub research question is 
therefore; 
What was the method or methods used for earnings management? 
If there were any indications or irregularities in the financial statements, then the auditors and 
the board of directors had a responsibility to investigate these risk factors. As the board and 
auditor have certain responsibilities and obligations to prevent and detect misstatements, one 
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can question why they did not uncover the fraud at an earlier stage. The research question is 
therefore; 
Should the auditor or board have detected the fraud earlier? 
I will attempt to answer this question by looking at the circumstances and the information the 
auditor and board had available and take their responsibilities and duties according to the law 
into account.  
1.3 Scope and demarcations 
I use a case study approach when examining the topic of fraud and earnings management, and 
build on already established empirical results on the matter. Hence, the paper is empirical in 
nature, with a case approach. A lot of information concerning the power industry is based on 
knowledge from working as an auditor in a power company, conversations with experienced 
auditors as well as working papers. Thus, the amount of references is limited in chapter 5. 
 
I focus on the case of Kraft & Kultur in Sweden, a subsidiary of Troms Kraft, and try to 
explain how management was able to misstate the financial statements over so many years. 
To accomplish this I will look at the environment surrounding the company, such as industry 
characteristics and existing corporate governance mechanisms and try to explain the 
incentives and opportunities for fraud that existed. I have limited the scope of the paper to 
focus at a few governance mechanisms, such as internal controls, auditors and the board. The 
accounting standards are only briefly discussed, but mainly to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the problem with recognizing revenues in the power industry, and to 
understand the method of earnings manipulation.  
 
I will also analyze information in the financial statements to look for warning signs and try to 
understand the specific methods the company might have used when manipulating earnings. I 
will use this to evaluate if the board and auditors performed their job satisfactory. A drawback 
is that the available information is limited. The investigation of Kraft & Kultur and Troms 
Kraft is still ongoing, and the trial is not due until next year. Hence, the results and liabilities 
of the different parties will not be known until after this point. Most of the analyses and 
information presented in the paper is therefore based on the external investigation performed 
by Ernst & Young and publicly available information such as financial statements from 
Troms Kraft and Kraft & Kultur, and newspaper articles. Consequently, my conclusions and 




results might be biased. Moreover, I assume that the information from Troms Kraft 
concerning the corrected financial statements and the fraud allegations is truthful and that it is 
the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in Kraft & Kultur who is the main responsible. The 
external investigation also confirms this fact. As the external investigation does not analyze 
the accuracy of the financial statement numbers, evaluations of the accuracy and methods of 
earnings management will be based on my own assessments.  
1.5 Structure of the paper 
Part I is an introduction to the paper, the problem and research question and overview of 
methods and research performed. 
Part II provides the theoretical background of the paper, including theory on corporate 
governance, earnings management and fraud. In particular, I focus on the incentives and 
methods of earnings management and fraud and the specific circumstances that allow fraud to 
happen in a firm. 
Part III reviews the financial reporting frameworks, including the basic accounting principles 
and standards that apply when recording revenues and costs, and more specifically the 
challenges when recording revenues in the power industry and the risk of fraud.  
Part IV is the main part of the paper, dealing with the case of Troms Kraft. This part includes 
an introduction to the company and the fraud, an analysis of the financial statement and 
environment, and finally a discussion of the work of the board and auditor. 
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PART II – THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2. Theory on earnings management and fraud  
2.1 Definition of earnings management and fraud 
There are numerous definitions of earnings management (EM) in the literature. I chose to take 
a broad view of the topic, including not only management of earnings but all information in 
financial reporting as this information also has the potential to mislead external decision 
makers and affect the stock price. Consequently, I find the following definition by Healy and 
Wahlen to be of most relevance;  
 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some shareholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p. 368). 
 
As EM only deals with external reporting it is restricted to financial reports (financial 
statements, quarterly reports etc), where the firm presents numbers and information on the 
current financial situation (Kinserdal, 2006). EM also incorporates situations when important 
information concerning the financial position and profitability of the company is omitted. EM 
is typically done by top management, but can also be performed by the board, accounting 
committees and even general assembly or others (ibid). However, it must be someone in 
charge of preparing or signing the external financial statements.  
 
A term closely relating to EM is fraud. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
defined financial fraud as the intentional, deliberate misstatement or omission of material 
facts, or accounting data which is misleading, and, when considered with all the information 
made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or hers judgment or decision 
(1993). In other words, fraud is the action of manipulating financial results to deceive the user 
in order to get an unjust or illegal advantage. Hence, fraud and EM are both dealing with 
deliberate adjustments of the financial information to obtain some sort of personal benefit. 
While EM can be said to deal with managing numbers both inside and outside the limits of the 
law, fraud clearly concerns alterations outside the law. EM rather deals with to what degree 




financial information is unbiased, faithful, relevant, and complete (in accordance with the 
conceptual framework described below).  
Fraud clearly violates Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), as the financial 
statement is altered and does not reflect the true economic performance of the firm. As there 
is a range of degrees to which a company can manage their earnings, it might be helpful to 
think of EM as a continuum to better understand the concept. The continuum can be seen 
underneath (Figure 1). At one end of the spectrum we find conservative accounting with few 
nonrecurring or unusual items, and a close approximation of the economic reality. Moving to 
the right we find an increasing level of aggressive accounting until we find outright fraudulent 
financial reporting in the other end (Giroux, 2004). The difference between fraud and creative 
accounting is essentially that fraud is clearly illegal while creative accounting, although 
outside the boarders of GAAP, is harder to prove or find evidence to support. 
 
 
 Figure 1: The earnings management continuum (Giroux, 2004) 
 
Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between errors and EM and fraud. While errors or 
misjudgments can occur due to lack of information or insight, EM and fraud are deliberate 
deviation from best estimates with the intention to mislead someone (Healy & Wahlen, 1999) 
(Stuart, 2011). The motive for EM and fraud is not necessarily management benefits, but 
could also be in the interest of the firm, employees, shareholders or creditors.  
 
To conclude, EM and fraud is most fundamentally about altering or omitting information in 
financial reports to mislead external users and decision makers about the underlying economic 
performance of the firm. The reasons why people manage earnings are usually one or a 
combination of three factors, first of all because it is easy, secondly because it involves some 
sort of reward and thirdly because the probability of getting caught is low (Schilit, 2002). In 
the next section some common incentives and methods of EM is described, and also the 
circumstances under which EM is most likely to occur. 
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2.2 Earnings management incentives 
Incentives for EM can generally be divided into two; (1) to maximize shareholder value (both 
short term and long term) and (2) to maximize personal gain (Giroux, 2004). Maximizing 
shareholder value could be done either through increasing profit or by beating earnings 
estimates, with the intention to increase share price. The motivation to increase share price 
can come both from internal and external pressure. External pressure mainly stem from the 
capital markets and their expectations of the company’s performance (Burgstahler & Eames, 
2006). As financial analysts and investors use financial information to value stocks, this gives 
an incentive to manage earnings to influence the short term performance of the stock. 
Management also faces internal pressure, for instance from the board, as the board is 
responsible to design performance targets and rewards for top management. This way 
management has incentives to meet certain financial targets and growth levels. In addition, 
management behavior is affected by the fact that the board has the power to hire and fire top 
management which provides incentives to show growth in firm value or other performance 
measures. This also includes avoiding negative results and a desire to maintain steady 
earnings growth. Maximizing shareholder value could also be from reducing profits with the 
intention to obtain lower tax rates, less competition, reduce pressure for salary increase or in 
order to stabilize results to be perceived less risky (income smoothing).  
 
Managing earnings to maximize personal gain is usually performed by management and is 
achieved either by increasing results, lowering results or stabilizing results. The motive to 
increase results or beat earnings estimates could be to maximize bonuses, avoid violation of 
debt covenants, to be perceived as a good manager or to improve job security. As 
compensation is often directly or indirectly based on performance targets, management has 
incentives to manage earnings to reach these. The reasons for wanting to reduce results could 
be to reduce pressure for salary increases or as a way to reduce the pressure on future year’s 
results (to save for a rainy day). The incentive to stabilize results is led by the desire to show 
stable and predictable earnings as investors dislike variance, in addition to the reasons 
mentioned above.  
 
To summarize, there are many incentives to perform EM, from maximizing compensation and 
securing career development, to avoid breach of debt covenants or as a way of reducing taxes. 
The incentives are driven both from internal pressure to beat budget numbers, as well as 




external pressure from analyst and creditors. As EM often simultaneously benefits both 
shareholders and management, it can be hard to isolate the primary motive of EM (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). Hence, it is difficult to conclude on the rationale. In the following I will 
describe some of the most frequently used methods of EM and fraud in order for the reader to 
gain a better understanding of how EM usually is performed.  
2.3 Earnings Management methods 
Revenues are considered the most important factor in determining a company’s success, as it 
is an essential measure of a company’s growth and potential. In addition, revenues have a 
large effect on the result in the financial statement. It is also an item associated with much 
uncertainty - which opens the opportunity of manipulation. Consequently, the highest 
occurrence of EM is found in the revenue recognition process. 
 
One method of EM is income smoothing, which is a way of shifting current income to later 
periods or shifting future income to the current period by eliminating earning peaks and dips 
(Giroux, 2004). This way income appears to be smoother and steadily growing as movements 
in income are wiped out. The purpose of income smoothing is to avoid showing losses, to 
show low volatility in earnings and to show an upward income growth. The principal reason 
why listed companies misstate financial statements is to meet the expectations of investors 
and analysts, to avoid a fall in the company’s stock price (Stuart, 2011).  
 
If the company’s earnings are below target the company could be tempted to report higher 
than true earnings, either through recording income prematurely or by recording fictitious 
revenue (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997). An example of premature revenue recognition is to 
record revenue before the good is delivered or service rendered or when significant 
uncertainties still exists. Recognizing fictitious revenue will inflate financial statements now 
at the expense of future earnings. Companies that have improperly recognized revenue in one 
period, often continues to inflate revenue in later periods to cover up the previous improperly 
recorded revenue and losses. The result is that revenues are inflated at an increasing rate, and 
in many cases this ultimately leads to fraud.  
 
For the same reasons, the company may want to defer revenue when actual revenue is above 
the targeted or budgeted revenue. This way the company creates a reserve for future periods, 
to be able to show growth or avoid losses when income is lower. Income smoothing is 
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typically done through using discretionary provisions (Peek, 2004) or by the use of accrual 
accounting (Kaznik, 1999). 
 
Shifting expenses between periods is also a method of smoothing income. One method is to 
move expenses and losses into one single year that already has poor results (big bath). This 
way the company creates a buffer for the future, to be able to show growth and smooth 
income. This can be done by writing down assets from book value to a lower market value, by 
overstating restructuring expenses or other provisions (Peek, 2004). The company can also 
increase earnings by shifting expenses to later periods, for instance by improperly capitalizing 
costs or by depreciating assets at a too slow rate (Schilit, 2002).   
 
These are just some of the methods of EM, and are not meant to be a complete list. The 
purpose is just to show some of the many methods that exist to manage the firm’s earnings. 
Management and others responsible to prepare the financial statement are always finding new 
creative ways to manipulate financial statement numbers.  
Red flags in Revenues 
A red flag is a warning signal or an indication that something is wrong in the financial 
statement. If management is smoothing the company’s earnings by recording fictitious sales 
or recording sales to early, this can be detected by looking at the cash flow from operations as 
the cash flow will not show the same growth as revenue. When the increase in cash from 
operations is less than the increase in reported results from a period to another, it can indicate 
that revenue is recorded too early. If the company is continuously manipulating their earnings 
year after year, an inconsistency between the income statement and cash flow will eventually 
reveal that something is wrong. Large accruals and hence large differences between earnings 
and cash flow is an indication of EM (Kaznik, 1999) (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). Moreover, 
this may be a sign that management is chasing growth at the expense of profitability. If 
increases in accrued income are larger than increases in accounts receivables, this can also 
suggest that revenue is recorded too early.  
 
Another approach of spotting red flags in the financial statement is to analyze accounts 
receivables. Because accounts receivables usually follow sales, one should be aware if long 
term receivables increases significantly compared to sales as this could indicate fraud. It does 
not necessarily mean that the numbers are wrong, but it is definitely a warning sign. It might 




imply that the company’s accounts receivables department is falling behind in billing 
customers or that their customers are unwilling to pay. It can also be a consequence of 
changes in the company’s payment terms, as the ratio increases if the company extends the 
credit time to customers. What is more, it can mean that customers are unable to pay, thus 
making it necessary to increase the bad loss provision and the corresponding cost. The two 
latter are the more serious. However, it is important to remember that an analysis cannot 
reveal fraud, but will just give indications that something is wrong.  
2.4 The environment  
Several factors influence the frequency and magnitude of EM and many studies suggest that 
EM and fraud is more likely to occur if the responsible person has an incentive or face some 
sort of pressure. An opportunity to perform EM also needs to be present. Moreover, the 
behavior needs to be rationalized. Pressure, opportunity and rationalization are three 
circumstances that usually are present in some degree when fraud occurs. This is commonly 
known as the fraud triangle (Stuart, 2011). In the following the framework will be presented, 
to understand the circumstances under which EM and fraud occur.  
 
Figure 2: The Fraud Triangle (Stuart, 2011) 
Pressure 
The frequency of EM is closely related to the incentives or pressures that management or 
others in the company face from the external and the internal environment. Pressure is the 
motivation for the person who commits the fraud, and can stem from both internal and 
external sources. External pressure can stem from society, media, owners, analysts or other 
stakeholders. For instance, managers may try to show that revenue has increased, even if it 
has not, because outsiders, particularly owners, expect a certain level of growth (Giroux, 
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2004). Failing to meet targets could result in a fall in the company’s stock price, lower salary, 
failure to meet debt covenants etc. Hence, management is facing pressure or incentive to 
misstate financial statements. The source of the pressure depends on the ownership structure 
and size of the company. As larger, public companies usually are in the public eye, 
management faces pressure to show positive results and growth to potential investors and 
analysts. As a result, one would expect a higher frequency of EM and fraud among these 
companies. However, as the firm grows so does transparency, which reduces the possibility of 
performing EM. Nonetheless, a higher earnings pressure will increase the tendency of EM. 
Ownership structure also affects the frequency of EM (Thomsen & Conyon, 2011). As large 
owners have more control over management, they may pressure management to perform EM.  
 
Pressure from the firm’s creditors can also affect the tendency of EM. When the firm is under 
financial distress or approaching its debt covenants, the occurrence of EM and fraud is higher 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). If the company violates its covenant ratios, they may face 
difficulties refinancing their debt and also run the risk of high fines. These two circumstances 
are interconnected as covenants often include minimum requirements for solvency ratios. 
Listed Norwegian firms report solvency ratios based on balance sheet numbers, and a frequent 
covenant requirement is book equity ratio. Consequently, management has strong incentives 
to manage company book values and earnings numbers to meet requirements and avoid fines.  
 
Pressure for fraud might also be due to personal reasons. Personal financial problems or 
addictions may motivate someone to commit fraud and misappropriation of assets. A person’s 
desire for material goods may also be a strong motivation for fraud. The criminologist 
Cressey found that the great majority of those who had committed fraud did it to meet their 
financial obligations (1973). Moreover, the tendency increase around events such as IPOs, 
mergers and takeovers, loan renewals, changes of management or auditors and changes in 
regulations (Kinserdal, 2006). On these occasions, management motivation is to obtain a 
favorable stock price, offer price (acquisition), better loan terms etc.  
Opportunity  
Opportunity is the possibility or ability to commit fraud in a company and hence a necessary 
attribute of fraud. In addition to motive, the person committing EM or fraud must believe that 
there is an opportunity to commit and conceal their actions, as he or she does not wish to be 
caught. A weak or lacking control system increases the opportunity and risk of fraud, as it is 




easier for employees to exploit access rights to assets and records. Moreover, a lacking 
oversight by management and owners offers the opportunity to both commit and conceal 
fraud. This also applies to external control mechanisms, such as the quality and level of 
regulations and the quality and independence of the board and auditor. Hence, the quality of 
internal and external control mechanisms greatly influences the possibility to detect and avoid 
EM (Stuart, 2011).  
 
However, most controls can be overridden and circumvented by people with sufficient 
motivation or control. As administrators of the firm, management is in a unique position to 
commit fraud. They have the power and necessary skills to manipulate accounting records. 
Persons with technical competence like the CEO or CFO, knows how to exploit control 
weaknesses in the company, and has the skills to deceive analysts, auditors and board 
members (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004). This risk is present in most firms, even if controls are 
well designed and effective. Management can also seek assistance from subordinates as their 
authority and position in the company can facilitate the involvement of additional employees. 
However, owners and the board of directors have a certain control over this aspect. By hiring 
the appropriate management, encouraging high ethical standards and implementing 
appropriate controls the board can limit this opportunity to a great degree.  
 
As the firm grows and becomes more complex, it is increasingly time consuming and difficult 
for outsiders to understand the company’s business. These also increase the possibility and 
opportunity of EM (Giroux, 2004). Moreover, the existence of complex accounting rules and 
discretional estimates provides opportunities to perform of EM, as estimates are usually based 
on the subjectivity and discretion of management. When estimates relates to uncertain future 
conditions, management can choose the most beneficial accounting rules and assumptions to 
portray the firm or themselves in a beneficial way. Because of the information asymmetry 
between management and outsiders, investors and auditors have difficulties to judge the 
appropriateness of the estimates. 
Rationalization  
Even though opportunity and pressure to perform EM and fraud exist, a person’s ethical 
standards and honesty usually prevent such actions. The personal characteristics of 
management and others, such as morality, wealth and ambition, greatly influence the 
willingness to perform EM. Rationalization is the last condition that is present when fraud 
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occurs, and is the attitude or thought process where the person justifies their actions to 
themselves or others (moral justification). According to research, a primary driver of fraud is 
the mindset and culture present in the company (Rockness & Rockness, 2005). This is further 
closely related to the attitude of top management, which has strong influence of the 
organization’s ethical conduct and culture  (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 1998) (AICPA, 2002).  
A top manager or others with strong personalities can more easily commit fraud as they are 
more capable of convincing and persuading employees and others, such as auditors and board 
members. They can also more easily use their power to convince employees to manipulate 
earnings numbers.  
 
When employees commit fraud, there are often other motivations and reasons. One 
explanation can be derived using equity theory, where the basic idea is that employees wish to 
maintain equity between their inputs in a job (effort) and the outcomes that they receive from 
it, against the perceived inputs and outcomes of others (Adams, 1965). As people constantly 
compare themselves to others, for instance their colleagues, they try to achieve and maintain 
fairness between their efforts compared to others. If an employee thinks he is not being 
adequately compensated for his or her work effort, he will try to balance this inequity and the 
more dissatisfied this person is, the harder he or she will work to balance the scales which 
might ultimately lead them to rationalize a criminal act. 
 
To summarize, pressure, opportunity and rationalization are circumstances under which fraud 
is more likely to occur, and all three conditions are usually present to some degree when fraud 
occurs.  
3. Corporate Governance mechanisms 
Corporate governance deals with mechanisms that aim to direct and control the company, 
such as ownership, boards, incentive systems and corporate law (Thomsen, 2010). These 
mechanisms are important in regards to EM and fraud. Most fundamentally, corporate 
governance deals with the problems of separating ownership and control, which is the main 
theme in the principal agent theory. The principal employs an agent to manage the daily 
operations of the firm, and as the principal and agent might have different interests, there is a 
potential risk of the agent acting in his own interest at the principal’s expense (ibid). The 
principal therefore need to monitor the agent, and find ways to ensure that their interests are 




aligned. This aim is to avoid that the agent behaves opportunistically, by maximizing his own 
benefits and personal utility on the expense of the principal.  
3.1 Regulation 
One way of preventing that the agent acts in his own best interests, is to establish laws and 
regulations that have the ability to punish the agent if breached. The Norwegian Private 
Limited Liability Companies Act (Aksjeloven) regulated the responsibilities and duties of the 
general manager or CEO. According to chapter 6-14 the general manager is responsible for 
the day to day management and administration of the firm. This include to carry out the 
company’s overall strategy, to design and implement relevant control activities, make sure 
that the financial reporting is correct, as well as the upper responsibility for finance and risk 
management. Moreover, the law states that the general manager is subordinate to the board of 
directors and their instructions, meaning that the board can intervene in decisions that 
originally belong to the general manager’s area of responsibility. The law also affirms that the 
CEO shall make sure that financial accounts are prepared according to laws and regulations 
and that the company’s assets are administered in an acceptable way. Consequently, the 
manager has the upper responsibility that the financial statement is free of misstatements.  
 
The general manager is also responsible to ensure that the boards of directors are getting the 
necessary information they need to fulfill their duties. As the board needs to be informed of 
the company’s activities and financial position in order to perform their control duties, the 
general manager is obliged to provide the board of directors with information on the 
company’s business, position and profit/loss development (chapter 6-15). These laws place a 
great responsibility in terms of fraud and EM prevention and detection with management. In 
part three of the paper I will describe the laws governing recognition of revenues. 
3.2 The board of directors 
According to Monks and Minow (2004) the aim of the board is to govern the firm and to 
ensure that the company is run in accordance with the best interests of the owners. This is 
known as the board’s fiduciary duty. The board members are appointed by the shareholders to 
perform monitoring duties on their behalf. Hence, the board acts as an intermediary between 
the owners and top management. The board has decision making rights over the firm’s assets 
and is responsible to support management in developing strategy, decide on executive 
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compensation and to sanction managers, ensure the law is being followed and to evaluate the 
company’s finances (Thomsen & Conyon, 2011). Consequently, the board plays an important 
role in corporate governance.  
 
The role and duties of the board are regulated in chapter 6 of the Norwegian Private Limited 
Liability Companies Act. Paragraph 6-12 determines that the board has the upper 
responsibility concerning the administration of the firm, thus placing the final authority of all 
major decisions with the board. Moreover, the board shall make sure that the business is 
properly organized (chapter 6-12.1) and is responsible to keep itself informed on the firm’s 
financial position. It is also accountable to control the company’s accounts, activities and 
capital management (chapter 6-12.3). The law also places a responsibility that financial 
statement is accurate and reflects the real financial position of the firm with the board.  
 
The board has certain advantages concerning prevention and detection of misstatements 
compared to other stakeholders. First of all, they can more easily monitor management as they 
have greater access to information compared to owners and creditors. This also makes them 
better equipped to analyze the financial state of the firm. If there are any indications of 
misstatement due to errors or fraud in the financial statement, the board is in a unique position 
as they can examine the balance or income account down to the specific accounting entries. 
They also have a duty to investigate such matters. Second of all, the board exercises a strong 
power over management as they ratify all major company decisions and have the ability to 
sanction management if necessary. However, the board depends on management to provide 
them with the necessary information. If management withholds or is hesitant to share 
information, the board will not be able to perform their monitoring duties efficiently or have 
valuable contributions to decisions.  
 
According to chapter 17-1, both the general manager and the board can be held liable for 
damages if they by intention or neglect cause loss to the company. As the law also states the 
duties of the different parties, which help clarify who is liable for the damage. Furthermore, 
the board is responsible to get the information they need in a manner they understand, to be 
able to act appropriately. This is important, as it implies that the board can be held liable for 
damages in a bankruptcy if they had information on the financial position of the company - 
even though they did not understand or were not able to analyze the numbers.  
 




To summarize, the law places a large responsibility on the board to communicate correct 
information to the users of the financial statement. The board has a duty to keep itself 
informed on the financial position of the firm and has a duty to act and investigate issues they 
find appropriate. If a misstatement in the financial statement is uncovered, the board can be 
held responsible if they did not show the necessary attention to issues and indications.  
 
As the directors are elected by the shareholders, the quality of the board depends on the 
election process and the shareholder’s ability to elect a competent and diverse board. Board 
members should be nominated according to an optimal composition of competence and 
necessary level of monitoring. This way management and board can cooperate to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
maximize the value of the company. In the following I will introduce some important board 
characteristics. 
Board Independence and Diversity 
Board independence is the most discussed aspect of board structure. It is believed that 
independent board members are more objective and better at monitoring management as they 
don’t have any ties to management. Board independence is measured as the composition of 
inside and outside board members. Outside board members can be further divided into 
independent and affiliated outside directors, who are somehow connected to the company. As 
dependent members are better informed on the company’s activities and business processes, 
they are typically better suited to support management on decisions that affects profitability. 
Independent board members on the other hand, are usually are less committed to 
management, look at outside performance signals and are less occupied by internal activities. 
Consequently, they are more capable of monitoring the manager’s actions and decisions. 
Thus, it is optimal to have a board made up of both independent and dependent members.  
 
Lately the focus on board quality seems to have shifted from independence towards diversity, 
as a diverse board is assumed to increase quality of decision making and ultimately 
performance. Members with financial competence are especially valuable, as competence to 
analyze and understand financial statement numbers increase the monitoring ability of the 
board. In addition, it is optimal to have diversity in terms of both independent and dependent 
directors, as this is believed to increase the board’s ability to monitor management and reduce 
groupthink. Moreover, directors with diverse competencies such as industry experience and 
financial literacy have the potential to increase the quality of decisions. 
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Board Size and Activity 
Research suggests that large boards are less effective than smaller ones, due to free rider and 
communication problems. Hence, larger boards usually have a more symbolic purpose and are 
easier to control. When the board approves the manager’s decisions without critical reflection, 
they are said to act as a rubber stamp. However, a company with many business areas needs 
more advice than a smaller one and consequently a small board is not always optimal. 
(Thomsen & Conyon, 2011). Nonetheless, the board depends on information and competent 
members to ensure the quality of important decisions. 
  
Board activity is measured by the number of board meetings and is used as an estimate of the 
amount of board work. Board members should be involved in decisions and spend enough 
time on board work to avoid acting as rubber stamps and be able to monitor. On the other 
hand, as the board has less information than management, not delegating work to management 
can result in suboptimal decisions. Moreover, very active boards may reduce management 
flexibility and make them reluctant to share information. More involvement from the board 
can also lead to less objectivity and independence. Consequently, increasing board work and 
meetings is only optimal up to a certain point (Thomsen & Conyon, 2011).  
Board Requirements  
Duality is a situation where the CEO occupies the role as chairman of the board. From a 
governance perspective, this does not make much sense as this suggests that the CEO is 
monitoring his own actions. This extensive power of the CEO might facilitate the speed and 
efficiency of decision making, but might be a disaster with a bad CEO. Listed companies in 
Norway and Sweden are required to have a separation between the board and management, 
meaning these roles cannot be occupied by the same person. The board is also required to 
have at least 50% independent directors. The reasons for these requirements are that the 
board’s degree of independence is expected to improve the company’s corporate governance.  
Other Control Mechanisms 
In Scandinavia, social norms and welfare ambitions work as substitutes for laws and act as 
governance mechanisms. As the consensus principle is very strong, it is important to preserve 
harmony. Consequently, management strives to make decisions that receive a high degree of 
consent  (Thomsen & Conyon, 2011). Other potential external control mechanisms are threat 
of takeover, labor market for managers, external analytics, creditors and competition. The 




labor market for managers serves as a control mechanism as managers depend on a good 
reputation to find a new job outside the company or to develop in their career. Providing 
management with incentives is one way of aligning the interests of management and owners.  
3.3 The auditor 
The auditor is required to express an independent opinion on whether financial statements are 
prepared in accordance with applicable financial reporting frameworks (ISA 200.3). The aim 
is to increase the level of confidence in the financial statements and reduce the information 
asymmetry between the users and producers of the financial statement. Moreover, the auditor 
ensures that the statement gives a true and fair view of the company’s performance and 
financial position. For these reasons, the auditor is another important governance mechanism. 
The responsibilities of the auditor are regulated in the International Standards of Auditing 
(ISA’s) 1 and the Norwegian Audit law (Revisorloven). According to ISA 300, the auditor is 
responsible to identify and assess the risks of material misstatement, whether due to fraud or 
error, based on an understanding of the entity and environment, including the existing internal 
controls. Hence, the auditor must obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence on whether 
material misstatements exist, through designing and implementing appropriate responses to 
identified risks. Consequently, the law places a responsibility on the auditor to prevent and 
detect fraud (Revisorloven §5-1.3). Similar to the board and CEO, the auditor can be held 
responsible for insufficient or fallacious information about the financial state of the company.  
  
As discussed above, the risk of EM and fraud is especially high when financial statements 
include significant estimates based on management good judgment. The ISAs requires the 
auditor to review accounting estimates and evaluate if they contain any biases and judge 
whether the bias, under the circumstances, represent a risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud (ISA 240.32b). The auditor should also review prior financial statements for significant 
accounting estimates and assess the reasonableness of management judgments and 
assumptions. Moreover, the auditor ought to have a questioning mind and be alert to 
conditions which may indicate misstatements. Thus, it is key that the auditor has the 
necessary knowledge to be able to execute an audit with high quality. The next chapter 
introduces the frameworks that regulate financial reporting. 
                                                 
1 International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) are professional standards regulating the auditor's responsibilities  
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PART III – FINANCIAL REPORTING  
4.  Financial reporting frameworks 
4.1 The Accounting Act  
The Accounting Act (Regnskapsloven) from 1998 regulates financial reporting in Norway. 
Most fundamentally, the company needs to comply with the basic accounting principles in the 
preparation of the financial statement. These principles are overall guidelines of accounting, 
and form the groundwork on which the more detailed accounting rules are based. These basic 
principles or guidelines can be found in chapter 4 of the Accounting Act (4-1 through 4-5). 
According to section 4-6 of the Accounting Act, the financial report should be prepared in 
accordance with good accounting practice, meaning in compliance with basic accounting 
principles, other provisions in the Accounting Act and other GAAP. In the following I will 
focus on the principles that are relevant for this paper. 
The transaction principle  
The transaction principle states that transactions shall be recognized at the value of 
consideration at the time of transaction (Accounting Act 4-1.1) According to the Accounting 
Act, a transaction involves the transfer of control of an economic resource, between two 
independent parties, in exchange for some sort of remuneration. Consequently, a transaction 
will alter the composition of the balance sheet in the relevant period and usually also affect 
the income statement (Johnsen & Kvaal, 1999). The transaction principle set guidelines on 
how goods or services should be recognized and valued in a transaction. According to the 
principle, the value of the good or service in the transaction is the value of the consideration. 
Transactions can be divided into sale- and purchase transactions, finance transactions and 
equity transactions.  
 
It is important to distinguish between real and non real transactions. A real transaction is a 
transaction where the two parties are independent, in other words an arm’s length transaction. 
Furthermore, the transaction must contain a real transfer of goods or services – the exchange 
or swap of identical goods or services is not regarded as a transaction that generates revenue. 
And finally, the transaction must involve a transfer of risk and control. The transaction time is 
identified as the time where both risk and control has been transferred between the buyer and 




seller (Johnsen & Kvaal, 1999). For retail sales, the transfer of risk and rewards of ownership 
usually match with the shift of possession of the good to the buyer.  
The Earned income principle  
The earned income principle affirms that income shall be recognized in the income statement 
when it is earned (Accounting Act, 4-1.2). As revenue is not necessarily earned in the same 
period as the transaction takes place, the sale by itself is not sufficient for revenue recognition 
(Johnsen & Kvaal, 1999). Consequently, revenue recognition can be deferred or accrued in 
relation to the time of transaction. Income accrual is common when dealing with long term 
production contracts. Earned income can be divided into transaction based and value based 
income. In traditional historical cost accounting, income is recognized on the basis of a 
transaction. However, in cases where income is value based, it is inappropriate to recognize 
income this way, for instance for financial assets or foreign exchange where an efficient 
market exist.  
 
Transaction based income can be further divided into income earned on the time of 
transaction, after the time of transaction and before the time of transaction. Normally, income 
is viewed as earned when the sale has taken place, meaning when goods are delivered or 
services rendered. The transaction is completed when all risks and rewards of ownership has 
been transferred to the buyer. The amount of revenue to be recognized is usually equal to the 
amount of cash the seller expects to receive, and this amount needs to be measured reliably. 
Moreover, the company cannot retain managerial involvement or effective control over the 
goods sold when they recognize revenue. Revenues should not be recognized before it is 
probable that economic benefits associated with the transactions pertains the company. In the 
case of deferred recognition of revenue, the transaction price is generally known, and the 
uncertainty relates to some other future component. In the case of accrued recognition, the 
uncertainty usually relates to the transaction price, which in this case needs to be estimated 
(Johnsen & Kvaal, 1999). 
The matching concept 
According to the Accounting Act costs shall be expensed in the same period as related 
income (4-1.3). The main aim of the financial statements is to measure the firm’s performance 
in an accounting period, so that users are able to make informed decisions about the firm. The 
matching principle improves the measurement of results, as the disparity between when costs 
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are incurred and when revenue is realized is removed. With the periodic matching of costs to 
revenues, incurred expenses are offset with the related income on a cause-and-effect basis 
(Kvifte, 2006). This usually means that expenses are recorded when goods are transferred or 
services rendered. Moreover, when there is no direct association between revenues and 
expenses, matching become more discretionary. A document from the EC Accounting 
Advisory Forum explains that the matching principle is usually understood as the practice of 
allocating expenditure to the related income (2005, p. 19). Thus, allocating expenditure 
involves the deferral and accrual of costs. The size of accrued liabilities is usually uncertain 
and needs to be estimated based on subjectivity, which provides an opportunity for EM. 
Hence, the matching principle makes it easier to evaluate the firm’s profitability and 
performance, but also enables management to manage earnings numbers as the principle is 
flexible, 
Best estimate 
The Accounting Act (4-2) requires the use of the best estimate in case of uncertainty, which 
implies considering all available information when the annual accounts are prepared. Hence, 
all foreseeable liabilities and potential losses that occurred during the accounting period or 
earlier should be recognized, even if they were discovered after the end of the accounting 
period. These items should be valued at expected value and be based on the latest available 
information in order to be unbiased. Because the expected value is unknown in many cases 
subjective judgment is necessary, which further provide opportunities for creative accounting.  
 
Moreover, Section 3-2a requires the financial statement to give a true and fair view 
(rettvisende bilde) of the company’s financial situation, and overrides the basic accounting 
principles and the other rules in Chapter 4,5,6,7 of the Accounting Act.   
4.2 IASB Framework 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent, standard setting 
body of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The foundation is responsible 
to write IFRS, formerly International Accounting Standards (IAS), and to promote the use and 
application of these standards. The IFRS and IAS is required or permitted to be used by more 
than 100 countries, including Norway and Sweden (Stuart, 2011). It is useful to be familiar 
with the framework, in order to understand the underlying prerequisites and fundamental 
principles of the financial statement (Kvifte, 2006). 




Users of the financial statement 
As the financial statement has many users, its quality depends on the user’s interest in the 
firm. IASB and other standard setting organizations have identified the investor as the 
primary user of the financial statement (Kvifte, 2006). The aim of the financial statement is to 
communicate useful and valuable information to these decision makers to enable them to 
make informed decisions about the company. Thus, the quality of the financial statements 
depends on the ability to accurately reflect the underlying economic performance of the firm. 
To be useful, information need to be relevant and faithfully represent what it claims to 
represent (ibid). Relevance and faithfully represent are two fundamental qualitative 
characteristics in the IASB framework. The framework further has four enhancing qualitative 
attributes, namely comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability, which aim to 
improve the usefulness of financial information. These qualitative characteristics will be 
explained in the following. 
Understandability 
Information must be understandable for users with a reasonable knowledge of business and 
economics (IASB Framework, no 25) and is understandable if it is classified and presented in 
a clear and concise way. As relevance is more important than understandability, relevant 
information should be included even when it is hard to understand (Kvifte, 2006).  
Relevance 
Financial information is relevant if it affects a user’s decision, or if it contains information on 
management performance (Kvifte, 2006). In addition, information needs to be timely to be 
relevant, in other words available in time to influence decisions. If information is late, it loses 
its value. Hence, timeliness is a prerequisite for relevance. Another related term is materiality, 
a firm specific feature of relevance that concern the nature or magnitude of items in the 
financial report. Only information that is material is regarded to be relevant by the IASB 
(Kvifte, 2006).   
Comparability 
Information in the financial statement needs to be comparable to similar firms (uniformity), 
and also with the same firm over time (consistency), in order for information to be useful in 
decision making. This way the user can see the firm’s development in revenue or other line 
items and evaluate how the company is performing compared to its peers. Hence, 
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comparability facilitates the identification and understanding of similarities and differences 
between firms and within the same firm over time.  
Reliability 
According to the framework, information in the financial statements must be neutral, that is, 
free from bias in order to be reliable. This is closely related to the best estimate principle in 
the Accounting Act. Moreover, IASB states that reliable information must be valid, implying 
that the financial information faithfully represents what it is supposed to. This assures 
decision makers that information is neutral and accurate, and that the company’s financial 
condition is represented truthfully. A problem is that information can be valid and reliable, 
even though it is not verifiable or objective. IASB emphasize that it is more important that 
information is valid than verifiable. This can be seen from the increase in the allowance of fair 
value accounting in IFRS, as fair value is in less verifiable than historical cost in most cases 
(Kvifte, 2006).  
 
As companies often have to choose between relevance and reliability when preparing 
financial reports, these are seen as competing requirements.  This relates to how the items in 
the financial statement are to be recognized and reported. In the next section, the different 
methods of measurement will be briefly discussed.  
Measurement Methods 
The Framework lists the following measurement methods; historical cost, current cost, net 
realizable (settlement) value, and present value (discounted). However, it does not state under 
which conditions or when different measurement principles should be used. A variety of these 
are used today and in combination. Historical cost is the most used measurement basis. Assets 
such as inventory, intangibles and equipment are carried on the balance sheet at acquisition 
cost adjusted for depreciation and impairment. Fair value is the amount for which an asset 
could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s 
length transaction (IAS 39.9). In recent years, IASB has taken tentative steps towards their 
long term goal of using fair market valuation as a measurement basis in IFRS instead of 
historical cost. Replacing historical cost basis with current cost system is argued to lead to 
more accurate financial reporting as values reflect the market’s assessment instead of the 
historic acquisition price. This would give more relevant information for external users, and 
increase financial reporting transparency. 





However, there are also many issues with fair value accounting. First of all, when financial 
instruments are not traded in active markets, fair value is difficult to measure and necessitates 
subjective estimations based on valuation models, which gives opportunity for EM. External 
users cannot easily judge if these estimates are reasonable or not. Secondly, a mixture of 
historical cost and fair value makes it hard to compare companies which can confuse readers 
and lead to misunderstandings. Thirdly, fair value accounting might give high variability in 
the value of assets and liabilities that translate directly into performance gains and losses, 
which results in increased volatility in the company’s earnings and equity.  
4.3 IAS 18 Revenue 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 18 is the applicable accounting standard used when 
recording revenue. The standard applies to accounting for revenue from the sale of goods, 
rendering of services and use by others of an entity's assets that give rise to interest, royalties 
or dividends. The standard defines revenue as increases in economic benefits in an accounting 
period that is linked to the firm’s ordinary activities, that increases the firm’s equity (IAS 
18.7).  
 
IAS 18 focus on the timing of revenue recognition, and lists certain conditions that need to be 
met in order to recognize revenue. First of all, revenue cannot be recognized until it is 
probable that the economic benefits associated with the transactions will go to the company. 
Secondly, both the amount of revenue and the costs incurred related to the transactions needs 
to be measured reliably. Thirdly, all significant risks and rewards of ownership need to be 
transferred to the buyer. This usually occurs when the legal title or control is passed to the 
buyer. Forth, the company cannot recognize revenue if they retain managerial involvement or 
effective control over the goods sold.  
 
Usually, the time of transaction is when the risks and rewards of the product or service are 
transferred. Identifying the time of transaction is usually straightforward, but can be 
complicated, for instance when the sale includes guarantees or subsequent services. In this 
case, only the price of the good should be recognized at the time of transaction and the price 
of the service should be capitalized in the balance sheet, as deferred income and recognized as 
revenue over the whole period of the service obligation (IAS 18.13).  
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The amount of revenue arising on a transaction is usually determined by agreement between 
the entity and the buyer. Revenue should be measured at fair value, meaning at the amount of 
cash the firm expects to receive. If the revenue is deferred the fair value may be less than the 
nominal amount of cash received or receivable. Then the fair value is determined by 
discounting the future cash flow using with an applicable interest rate. If revenue is based on 
an estimate, the standard states that the company and the other parties in the transaction 
should agree on the terms of the transaction, such as the compensation, the rights and 
obligations and the manner and terms of settlement before revenue is recorded. The standard 
also states the importance of an effective internal financial budgeting and reporting system.  
4.4 IAS 10 Events after the Reporting Period 
International Accounting Standard number 10 applies to events that occur after the reporting 
period, but before the issuance of the financial statements. The standard contains requirements 
for when such events should be taken into account in the financial statements. The standard 
separates between adjusting events and non-adjusting events. The adjusting events are events 
that exist at the end of the reporting period, which should be adjusted for in the financial 
statements. Non adjusting events on the other hand, arise after the reporting period, and are 
generally not disclosed in the financial statement (only when material). According to the 
standard, a company should update disclosures that relate to conditions that existed at the end 
of the reporting period to reflect any new information that it receives after the reporting 
period about those conditions (IAS 10.19) 
 
4 
Thus, the company ought to update disclosures that relate to conditions that existed at the end 
of the reporting period to reflect any new information that it receives after the reporting period 
about those conditions (ibid). For instance, a large estimate that has a large financial effect 
could be updated to account for new information. It also includes new information concerning 
the value of assets which indicates a fall in value that needs to be accounted for. Moreover, 
the company should also update the financial statement to conditions that arise after the 
reporting period, if these events are important, meaning they can affect the users decisions on 
the firm. This depends on the nature of the event and its financial effect.  




4.5 Discussion  
As financial reporting requires management discretion, it is particularly interesting in relation 
to EM. The accounting rules provides a great deal of flexibility to management and other 
preparers of the financial statement, and by exploiting this flexibility the company can 
increase revenues and stretch results. Even though this is not legal, it is difficult to find 
evidence or prove such accounting practices. Nevertheless, there is a tendency that aggressive 
accounting evolves and ultimately ends in more serious cases of fraud. Many efforts have 
been made to increase legislation and to improve accounting standards to avoid that the 
company exploits the accounting rules. However, according to Largay (2002), the mere 
existence of these rules is not the answer, as legislation will not prevent fraud from occurring. 
He claims that the only answer is the rebirth of professional judgment in an environment 
characterized by incentives that make the prudent exercise of judgment the only viable 
alternative. 
 
The Norwegian accounting standards are principles based, as opposed to rules based. This 
means that preparers, auditors, audit committees and boards need to exercise professional 
judgment when reporting and auditing the financial statements. Even though principles based 
standards provides more flexibility in accounting, researchers and academics argue that they 
are more advantageous compared to rules based standards such as the IFRS. The reason is that 
an increasingly detailed regulatory framework cannot substitute good accounting practice 
anyway, so the auditor and preparer need to exercise professional judgment to make sure 
financial reports fairly represents the economic reality of the firm. They believe good practice 
is a dynamic concept that allows practice to develop at the same pace as the economic 
environment.  
5. The power industry 
To understand how revenue is generated and recognized in the power industry it is useful to 
give a short overview of the industry’s value chain. The value chain includes generation, 
transmission, distribution and consumption of power. Figure 3 illustrates the value chain and 
key activities (Figure 3). In the following, I will focus on the two latter parts of the value 
chain, namely electricity distribution and consumption.  
 




Figure 3: The value chain in the power industry (own illustration, 2012) 
5.1 Electricity distribution  
Electricity is distributed to the end users through a grid system, which is owned and operated 
by a local grid company. The grid company operates a part of the national distribution grid, 
where it owns the electricity meters and the electric power grids. As the grid company has a 
natural monopoly on electricity distribution services, it is obliged by law to deliver electricity 
to the end users in their area (Svensk Energi, 2012). The grid company is also responsible for 
maintaining a reliable and effective distribution grid. There are about 150 grid companies in 
Norway, where the majority is smaller companies with fewer than 10.000 customers (NVE, 
2011). In Sweden, the market is dominated by a few large grid operators. The final customer 
pays for the distribution through a regulated network tariff, which is the basis of the grid 
company’s revenue. In addition to the network tariff, the final customer has a contract with a 
power retailer for buying electricity. In Norway, constraints on the revenues of grid 
companies are strictly regulated by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
(NVE). 
 
NVE has placed the responsibility of data collection at the grid company, on consumption at 
both the customer level and more aggregated level if necessary. This means that the grid 
company has to transmit the data to all the power suppliers in their concession area and the 
person responsible to settle accounts (Regulation on metering, settlement etc. no 301). 
Moreover, they are responsible that this data is reliable. The grid company is also responsible 
to provide stipulated data that can be used in the settlement in cases where meter readings do 
not exist. Consequently, the grid company is the administrator of all consumer data in the 
value chain. 





The contract between the consumer and the local grid supplier usually place the responsibility 
to read the meter with the consumer. The grid company is obliged to gather these data at 
certain intervals, depending in the customer’s total consumption. In Sweden, household 
customers are required to read the meters on a monthly basis. However, the general rule is 
that all meters have to be collected at least once year, unless this causes unreasonable costs or 
inconvenience to the grid company (Nettavtalen 5-2). The number of customers that fail to 
read their meter once a year is quite large and it is accepted it takes some time before the grid 
companies carries out the meter reading. There are many examples of customer complaints, 
where the customer has not read the meter over longer periods (5-10 years) where the main 
responsibility is placed at the customer, and not with the grid company (Elklagenemda, 2012).  
 
When the customer has read his meter and registered this with the grid company, the grid 
supplier forwards this information to the power supplier for invoicing. If the customer does 
not register his meter reading in time, for instance before the 15th of January, the grid 
company will usually wait a certain time period to allow the customer some time to still 
register. Depending on the grid company, this could mean everything from a week to a month, 
before the grid company eventually stipulates the customer’s consumption. After the grid 
company has received the meter reading, or alternatively made a stipulation, they are obliged 
to supply this data to the power supplier within three weeks. However, it is not unusual that 
these data arrive late.  
 
Some customers have installed automated meter reading (AMR) devices that automatically 
measure the customer’s utilization of energy and transfers these data to the grid company on 
an hourly basis. In Norway, companies with a yearly consumption over 100 000 kWh are 
required to have installed such devices (Olje- og energi departementet, 2007). This is about 
five times the consumption of an average household, hence only applying for a small amount 
of the customer base - mainly commercial and industrial customers. The introduction of such 
measuring instruments provides a better basis for correct settlements, compared to today’s 
system with manually read meters and stipulations. 
Customer profiles 
When reading the meter on a periodical basis, there is no possibility to determine how 
consumption is spread throughout the period. To estimate this, the grid company constructs 
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customer profiles, so called adjusted input profiles (justert innmatningsprofil JIP), which is a 
standard customer profile. They use this profile to estimate how consumption is spread 
throughout the day and between the different geographical areas. Thus, assume that all end 
users in an area have the same consumption pattern. The customer profile is calculated based 
on the difference between total physical delivered volume (less network losses), the actual 
delivered volume to the AMR devices and the number of other customers. Grid companies are 
required to make such profiles, and to use this profile when settling the accounts with the 
power companies.  
 
The grid company knows the total delivered volume (kWh) on the day after delivery. This 
information is supplied from Statnett2. However, as there are many different power suppliers 
operating in their concession area, they do not know how the split of volume between these 
suppliers. What they do know, is the amount of customers the different suppliers have in their 
concession area. Hence, they calculate a preliminary volume to the supplier based on the 
share of total customers the power supplier has. They use a macro calculation to distribute the 
volume on suppliers, based on the customer profile for the particular area. Consequently, 
there will be deviations between this preliminary volume and the actual total consumption for 
a specific power supplier. One problem with this volume distribution is that the grid operator 
has no incentives to make this estimation as accurate as possible, as they receive their 
revenues directly from the customers irrespectively. This deviation between the preliminary 
and actual volume is settled internally between the grid operator and the power supplier in 
arrears, after the actual consumption is known. In other words, the grid operator has to send 
out invoices and credit notes to all the suppliers operating in his distribution grid – which may 
take some time.  
5.2 Electricity consumption  
The last part of the value chain is the retail market, where power suppliers buy electricity in 
the market and sells it to the end consumer. Typically, the power supplier usually do not own 
or operate generation, transmission, or distribution facilities. The final customer can freely 
choose between all the power retailers participating in the power market and currently there 
are around 200 such retailers in Sweden (Proff, 2012). As users of electric power normally 
                                                 
2 Statnett is the national main grid owner and operator in Norway, equivalent to Svenska Kraftnät in Sweden 
(http://www.energifakta.no).  




either cannot or do not differentiate on whether power is generated from renewable sources, 
competition mainly focuses on price and the pressure on margins in the industry are high.  
Price of power  
The Nordic markets for electricity is integrated, and most trading happens through the Nordic 
power exchange Nordpool, where power suppliers buys electricity at spot price. The spot 
price of power is set according to total available electricity and size of demand (market 
clearing price), and is influenced by factors such as weather and temperature. As hydroelectric 
power and nuclear power represents 90% of total power production in Sweden, the price is 
heavily influenced by amount of available water in reservoirs, and production at nuclear 
power plants. If the availability or production is reduced at a reservoir or nuclear power plant 
- the price increases. The same happens when the outside temperature drops, as demand 
increases when consumers need more electricity for heating (Nord Pool, 2012). This makes 
demand and hence price extremely volatile throughout the year and between seasons. Even 
within hours, price can change dramatically. The price also varies between geographical 
areas, as the price is set in the equilibrium of an area’s demand and production. Price 
variations represent a risk for power suppliers, as it heavily influences revenue and profit. The 
power companies usually mitigate this risk by securing the price in advance.  
Hedging  
Margins from fixed price contracts are secured through financial energy contracts, either 
through buying futures contracts or options. The futures contract is a standardized contract 
between two parties to buy or sell an asset, in this case power, at a predetermined price and 
during a specified future time period (Mcdonald, 2006). The time period of the future reflect 
the time period of the power contract. The option is a contract which gives the owner the 
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an underlying asset or instrument at a specified 
strike price on, or before, a specified date. This way the company secures against price 
movements above the fixed price level they offer their customers and reduce the possibility of 
substantial losses. This is called hedging (ibid).  
 
Power retailers usually hedge electricity prices on fixed price contracts, based on the 
company’s total forecasted volume from these contracts (Kraft & Kultur, 2011). As a result, 
the company reduces their exposure to price variations. Customers with market price 
contracts, pays the spot price with a markup. This makes hedging unnecessary as the risk of 
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price variations lies with the customer. When a customer enters into a fixed price contract, the 
power company turns around and buys the amount of electricity the customer is expected to 
use during the contract’s time period. This is done by buying futures contracts or options at 
Nasdaq OMX Commodities. As the price can fluctuate a lot in a short period of time, the 
hedging should be done as soon as possible, preferably during a couple of minutes from the 
time the customer has agreed to a fixed price contract. Otherwise, the company has the risk 
that the price might increase, which makes the company vulnerable to losses. If a power 
company fails to secure the price, the company is exposed to price risk. If the price increases 
the company loses the difference between the price they pay in the spot market and the price 
in the contract. Similarly, they make a profit if the price increases. Because it is not possible 
to perfectly forecast demand, the company cannot safeguard against all price risk. Hence, 
there will always be some losses or gains due to price movements in a power company, but 
these are usually relatively small. 
 
If the company does not secure the price, they have a so called short forward position, 
meaning an obligation to sell power at a fixed price. If an investor has a short position, he has 
an expectation that the value of the asset will drop (Mcdonald, 2006). Consequently, the 
power suppler is speculating on a fall in the price of electricity if he does not hedge. In theory, 
there is no limitation on the maximum loss of such a short position (ibid). 
Contract price 
The price charged to customers can generally be divided into either market or fixed price. 
Contracts with market price are based on the daily spot price at Nordpool plus a markup. This 
contract can either apply for a set time period or be terminated at any time. Fixed price 
contracts guarantees the customer a certain price, and usually apply for a predetermined time 
period. The price is based on expected future prices (derived from futures prices) and is set 
somewhere between the cost price and what the market allows. 
5.3 Revenue recognition  
According to GAAP, revenue should be recognized when goods are transferred or services 
rendered, which for a power supplier is when the electricity is delivered to the customer. In 
theory, this implies that the power companies need to recognize revenue continuously, as 
electricity is constantly utilized. The result is that a portion of earnings needs to be estimated 
at all times because of the natural delay in meter readings. In the following, I will go through 




the information the power supplier use when calculating revenue, as well as how they 
estimate revenue at year end and the associated risk. I will start with the invoicing process. 
Invoicing 
The power supplier is free to choose the method of invoicing, as opposed to the grid company 
(Olje- og energi departementet, 2007). Thus, invoicing routines varies between suppliers, both 
in terms of frequency and method (before or after consumption). The frequency of meter 
readings and invoicing also varies between customer groups, but mainly occur on a monthly, 
quarterly or yearly basis. The most common invoicing method is to invoice after delivery, 
although some companies invoice before delivery. When invoices are sent after delivery, the 
invoiced amount is based on actual consumption derived from the of periodic cycle meter 
reading for the period or stipulated consumption. As payment takes place after delivery, the 
sale is on credit.  
 
When invoicing the end user, the power company use the customer profiles (constructed by 
the grid company) to decide how the total consumption is distributed throughout the period, 
and then use the applicable price to calculate the total invoicing amount. If the customer does 
not read his meter, the power supplier use the total stipulated amount obtained from the grid 
company and the same customer profile to calculate the total invoicing amount. It is a 
relatively large number of customers that are invoiced based on stipulated consumption, thus 
a large fraction of earnings are based on stipulations. If actual consumption differs much from 
this number, earnings will vary over time. Conclusively, invoiced amounts will rarely be 
aligned with the actual running consumption, as power companies have different supply 
contracts (many grid operators, yearly settlement, invoice based on stipulated values etc). 
Accounts receivables 
The invoiced amounts, whether accurate or not, is recorded as accounts receivables on the 
balance sheet. Accounts receivables are current assets on the balance sheet and should be 
valued at the amount of cash the client expects to collect the following year. Consequently, it 
should be recognized in the balance sheet after deducting a provision of estimated loss. 
Estimated loss for uncollectible accounts is recorded in the same period as the related 
revenues, with an offsetting credit to the allowance for uncollectible accounts. The change in 
the accounts receivable balance from one year to the next is reported as an increase or 
decrease to cash from operations. 




If consumption is stipulated, any errors in consumption will be corrected the next time the 
customer reads his meter. It is both the power supplier and the end user that bears the risk and 
cost if the stipulated value is wrong. So, if the invoiced consumption is higher than actual 
consumption the end user bears the loss, while the supplier bears the loss the other way 
around. Because of the large size of stipulated consumption, the risk of recognizing revenue 
in the wrong accounting period is high.  
5.4 Revenue Estimation  
Because of the delay in meter readings, actual consumption and earnings are not known with 
certainty until after the accounting period for a part of the customer base. Consequently, 
revenue earned from the last meter read date through the last day of the accounting period 
needs to be estimated. To assure the accuracy and completeness of revenues, suppliers of 
power is required to use their best estimate in consistence with the Accounting Act (section 4-
2) when estimating income. As the forecast and estimates of consumption and earnings 
usually involves several different products and prices it is a complex calculation. 
Accrued income 
The earned but not yet invoiced revenue is recognized as accrued income in the balance sheet 
and recorded as income in the income statement. When income is earned but not yet invoiced, 
the receivable amount is added (debited) to the accrued income account in the balance sheet, 
and an equal amount is credited in an income account. Accrued income represents the amount 
of income earned or accrued that is applicable to current or prior periods that has not yet been 
invoiced or collected. Eventually, when this consumption is invoiced, it is deducted (credited) 
from the accrued income account and added (debited) to accounts receivables on the balance 
sheet. When funds are collected, the cash account (or an equivalent) is debited, and the 
receivable account is credited. Accrued income is an interim account, meaning that it is a 
short-term asset, and since customers are invoiced at least once a year, the bulk of this 
account at year end should relate to sales that occurred throughout the year. 
 
Total delivered volume in the year minus already invoiced consumption is the basis of the 
income estimate. Consequently, the power supplier needs to obtain both volume and decide 
how this volume is distributed to contracts, in order to use the right prices. 





The power supplier have no overview of delivered consumption, but rather rely on the grid 
companies to supply this data, both on preliminary consumption as well as actual meter 
readings and stipulated consumption. When the company buys volume it states the 
preliminary consumption received from the grid supplier, and hence pays for the estimated 
volume. What complicates this is the fact that the power supplier is likely to operate in 
different local grids, hence need to rely on estimations from multiple grid companies. There 
are also other sources of errors, such as reading errors, reading delays, errors in the exchange 
of information to the power supplier as well as errors in stipulated data. In addition, data can 
arrive late, as information handling and processing is time consuming and complex due to the 
large size of data. The grid companies also have different data systems, which result in 
varying quality in data and estimations.  
 
A period’s accrued income is calculated based on the sum of preliminary total volumes from 
the meter read date to the end of the period, obtained from the different grid companies. Since 
the preliminary volume is the same as the volume reported and bought at Nordpool, the 
company can easily reconcile purchased volume to delivered volume obtained from grid 
companies. Nordpool sends out monthly invoices specifying the total volume bought each 
week. Moreover, the actual physical delivered volume should not differ too much from the 
sum of the already invoiced volume and the estimated volume used in the income calculation 
(alternatively minus prepayments). This way the company gets a reliable and fairly good 
estimate of earnings at the closing of accounts.  
 
Depending on the size of the company, they might have customers all across the country 
which implies they could need up to 150 different grid companies to provide them with 
preliminary volumes. As the preliminary volumes are only rough estimates, the total delivered 
volume used in the revenue estimate will in reality be the sum of 150 different estimates. 
Consequently, total volume used in the accrued income estimate might be inaccurate.  
Deciding the price 
Having now an estimate on total volume, the company needs to evaluate how volume is 
divided between the different contracts. This is important to get the best possible estimate, as 
prices differ between contracts (spot, fixed price etc.). If the volume distribution deviates 
much from the truth, the accruals and income would be wrongfully stated in the financial 
36   
 
 
statement. For instance, if the company completely misses the volume of spot price contracts, 
the estimate is inaccurate as the margins on spot price contracts and fixed price contracts can 
be significantly different. It is therefore crucial to use the best estimate when distributing 
volume. By using historical customer data already available in the company’s databases, an 
advanced excel model can help distribute volume based on the customer profile’s share of the 
total forecasted yearly volume. This consumption can then be used in the revenue estimate. 
Moreover, it is important that the calculation has the right and updated prices in order to give 
the best estimation of revenue. This might seem simple, but as prices can be manually 
transferred or changed in a manual earnings estimate –there is risk that price is not updated or 
incorrect. In addition, the company probably has a range of different prices in the fixed price 
contracts, depending on when the customer signed the agreement. This might make it hard to 
decide the average price. The accuracy of the price depends on the quality of the customer 
database (updated and correct data). 
 
After deciding the volume split, the revenue estimate can be calculated using the appropriate 
prices. When determining revenue from spot contracts, the company first decides daily 
consumption of these customers and then multiplies this with the applicable daily prices 
taking the fixed number of customers/installations into account. They determine the daily 
utilization of electricity from the customer profile received from the grid companies. For fixed 
price contracts, the company uses an average price of these contracts multiplied with the total 
volume. There are many sources of errors in this calculation, and this is where the main risks 
in the revenue estimation lies.  
Sources of error 
There are many sources of errors and misstatements in the accrued income estimate. First of 
all, the power supplier does not control any data on delivered volume - as it is the grid 
supplier that distributes the electricity to the end user. As mentioned earlier, the power 
supplier receives this data from the grid supplier. Since the grid supplier only has data on the 
total actual physical delivered electricity for a period, he does not know the volume split 
between the different power suppliers in his concession area. Thus, there is a risk that the 
preliminary volumes might be wrong. The settlement between the preliminary and actual 
volumes is not done until after the reporting period, there is a risk that the total volume used 
in earnings estimate is wrong. However, as most grid companies are fairly good at estimating 




volumes the risk of using wrong total volume is not significant. The relationship between the 
power supplier and the grid company is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: The grid supplier and power supplier (Own illustration, 2012) 
The largest source of error in the accrued income estimate relates to the volume split between 
the different contracts. As prices differ between contracts, the revenue estimate can be correct 
concerning total volume – but still be over or over or understated if volume is incorrectly 
divided between contracts. Since this volume split can be difficult to know in advance, there 
is typically a deviation between estimated accrued income in the balance sheet and the actual 
earned income. The size of the deviation depends on the quality of data concerning historical 
consumption of customers, whether the company is growing or in steady state, the number of 
contracts, grid companies, quality of data at the grid company, quality of meter readings etc.  
 
To illustrate, if the company is in steady state, the distribution of volume can be an 
unproblematic exercise. In this case, the customer base is more or less constant with only a 
limited numbers of customers rotating. Then, it is important that information in the customer 
database is valid and updated. If the company has high quality data on their customer’s 
consumption pattern, they will also have a good idea on how volume should be distributed to 
the different price contracts. On the other hand, if the company is growing it lacks historical 
customer data. What is more, the quality of the customer database might be poor. 
Consequently, the revenue calculation can be a challenge and might not give valid and 
reliable results. 
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The precision of calculations of consumption and accrued revenues will also vary as certain 
interim periods are generally subject to more estimation variability than others e.g. due to 
seasonal variations. Hence, the different customer profile’s share of total consumption will 
vary and case some variability in the accuracy of estimations. It is therefore also necessary 
that the firm reviews and revises the revenue estimate if necessary and that the auditor 
reconciles the actual invoiced revenue to the estimate in the following year. 
Conclusion  
As it takes time to collect and update consumption data from for the different grid suppliers, it 
can take months before the actual consumption is known after delivery. This might take as 
long as 3-6 months, depending on when the meter is read and stipulated and when the power 
supplier gets the final settlement of accounts from the grid companies. Figure 5 sums this up 
in a simplified timeline. Thus, revenue relating to the last period in the year needs to be 
estimated in the financial statement. After the financial statement is issued, the power supplier 
will know the size of actual earned income, and can see if the estimate was accurate or not. In 
a large Norwegian power company, these deviations have historically varied between +/- 80 
MNOK (Hafslund ASA, 2011), thus affecting the profit both positively and negatively. The 
deviation stems mainly from incorrectly distributing total volume to contract types, but there 
are also some deviation from using incorrect volumes. Even though this deviation seems very 
high, it equals less than one per cent of total earnings, thus relatively immaterial. It amounts to 
15% of accrued income at year end. 
 
Figure 5: Timeline (Own illustration, 2012) 
To sum up, the revenue estimate is based on preliminary volume from the grid company, after 
subtracting already invoiced volume for the period, distributed to customer profiles based on 




the forecasted share of the profile’s total demand. The deviation between estimated and actual 
income can be quite large, as this is a complex calculation. What is more, the deviation can be 
both positive and negative as this depends on if volume is overstated on contracts with high 
margins or low margins.  
5.6 Risk of fraud  
The accrual method of accounting aims to provide a more accurate picture of the company's 
economic performance in a period (FASB, 1985), but also increases the risk of misstatement 
in the financial statement. As revenues have a large effect on the company profit, there is an 
inherent risk of fraud in the revenue recognition process, mainly due to fraudulent financial 
reporting, as management or others have an incentive to manage earnings. As accrued income 
is an estimate it is susceptible to misstatement both due to errors and fraud. This stems from 
the fact that the estimate necessitates subjective estimations, which provides flexibility and 
opportunity to manage earnings. There is a risk that revenue is recognized in the wrong 
accounting period, or that accrued earnings are estimated to high or low. As both consumption 
and price are uncertain variables, the risk that management overstates earnings increase. 
Moreover, small adjustments in the underlying assumptions on the volume distribution may 
result in very different outcomes. Thus, both the reliability and relevance of the estimate can 
be questioned. Another issue is the fact that inputs and formulas in the valuation models are 
not publicly available. Hence, external users cannot easily judge if the estimates are 
reasonable or not. This increases the probability of EM in the industry. 
 
As revenues at year end usually include a considerable estimate, there is an inherent risk of 
EM and fraud in the business. Moreover, the risk increases because of the high volatility in 
earnings in this industry. This emphasizes the importance of reliable internal control systems 
to prevent and detect misstatements in the revenue recognition process. However, there is 
always the risk that management might override such controls (AICPA, 2002). The board and 
auditor also have a responsibility to analyze the company’s calculations and estimations and 
assess the reasonableness of these calculations. However, as management has more 
knowledge on the variables in the calculation it is hard to question the estimate for the auditor, 
or another external stakeholder with less knowledge. 
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PART IV – TROMS KRAFT  
In this part of the paper I will use the theory presented in the first part on the case of Troms 
Kraft (TK). First, the company and facts of the fraud is presented. Then, the company’s 
financial statements are analyzed to look for indications of EM. Then, plausible methods used 
in the manipulation are discussed. Afterwards, I discuss whether the Board and auditor 
fulfilled their duties, based on the information they had available. The aim of this is to 
evaluate if the fraud could have been discovered earlier.   
8. Introduction to the company 
Troms Kraft AS is a vertically integrated energy group which generates, distributes and 
delivers electric power and offer fiber optic communications services in Norway, Sweden and 
Finland (Bloomberg, 2012). The company is headquartered in Northern Norway, where it 
operates twelve hydroelectric power plants, and has concession to distribute power in 15 of 
the 25 municipalities in Troms, making it the leading energy company in the area (Troms 
Kraft AS, 2012). With consolidated revenues of 3 billion NOK in 2011, it is also a large 
player in the Nordic market. Their power plants produce about 1.9 terawatt hours yearly, 
supplying more than 100 000 retail customers. The company is state owned and employs 
about 450 people. 
 
TK operates in other business areas as well, providing telecommunications services, 
efficiency consulting services and outdoor lighting facilities. Moreover, it develops and 
maintains a power grid, supervises and inspects electrical installations in businesses and 
private homes and manufacture and supply district heating for universities, schools, and sports 
centers. It also engages in trading electricity. In 2000, TK expanded its geographical scope 
with the establishment of the subsidiary Kraft & Kultur in Sweden.  
Kraft & Kultur  
Kraft & Kultur was founded with the vision to supply renewable energy to people that care 
about the environment, society and culture. Boris Benulis was one of the company’s founders 
in 2000, and had the position of CEO from this point until November 2011. The company 
experienced an incredible growth from the start and is currently Sweden’s sixth largest power 
retailer. In 2010, the company contributed with more than 50% of the group’s total revenues. 




The company sell renewable energy to more than 60 000 households, 5 000 companies and 




Table 1: Growth in Kraft & Kultur 2003 - 2010 (extracted and altered from K&K’s financial statements) 
Kraft & Kultur is the largest supplier of energy to Swedish municipalities, making 
municipalities an important source of revenue for the company – contributing with almost 
85% of total income in 2010. The company is one of the few suppliers that only provide its 
customers with green energy. In addition to their core strategy as an energy supplier, the 
company offers a broad selection of cultural products and services to differentiate themselves 
(Kraft & Kultur, 2012).  
8.1 Corporate Fraud 
In November 2011, during internal control routines and follow up, employees in TK 
discovered accounting abnormalities in the financial reports of Kraft & Kultur. A press 
release stated that the company had found strong indications that income, and hence profits, 
was overstated as a result of many years of manipulations (Troms Kraft, 2011). The company 
estimated that the misstatements had accumulated since 2002 and amounted to 1.8 billion 
SEK in overstated revenues. The findings were reported to The Swedish Economic Crime 
Authority, and the CEO, Boris Benulic, was pointed out as the main suspect in the case. 
Benulic and two other former central members of management were remanded to custody in 
April this year, suspected and charged with multiple felonies relating to fraudulent financial 
reporting. Benulic was held five weeks in custody, accused of serious violations of the book 
keeping act as well as serious economic misconduct. The other suspects are Pierre Sjöö, the 
former chief financial officer (CFO) and Erik Helmenius, who was involved in the company’s 
investments in ventilation and energy recovery. They are both face charges of fraud and 











2003 13 1692 568        
2004 13 1977 17 % 671        18 %
2005 14 1934 -2 % 728        8 %
2006 18 2122 10 % 850        17 %
2007 18 1995 -6 % 1 000     18 %
2008 30 2132 7 % 1 298     30 %
2009 49 2315 9 % 1 514     17 %
2010 91 3234 40 % 2 630     74 %
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Crime Authority and the trial is due next year. The CEO on the other hand, claims his 
innocence. According to him, the board is trying to cover up losses resulting from price 
speculations by framing him for manipulation. Benulic therefore pressed charges pressed 
charges against the former CEO in TK, Oddbjørn Schei (Jensen, 2011), who also were the 
chair of the board in Kraft & Kultur at the time of the fraud revelations. According to Benulic, 
it is not revenues that are overstated but rather costs of purchased power that is understated.  
 
An external investigation by the auditing firm Ernst & Young (2012), has also found strong 
indications that revenues is overstated as a result of many years of manipulations. The report 
by Ernst & Young also indicates that the CEO is the main responsible for the fraudulent 
financial reporting, with the help of other central members of management. Ernst & Young 
found no indications that members of TK or the auditor were involved in the fraud or that they 
were familiar with the misstatements. Nevertheless, managers in TK were members on the 
board in Kraft & Kultur (Ernst & Young AB, 2012), meaning they had responsibilities and 
duties to prevent and discover the fraud. The auditor also has duties to detect fraud in the 
financial statement.  
8.2 Business Strategy 
K&K buys power in the wholesale market and sells it to the customer with a fixed price or a 
market price plus mark up. K&K’s goal is to be the leading supplier of electricity in Sweden, 
by offering products and services within the cultural sector as a way of differentiating 
themselves. The CEO had an ambitious competitive strategy, and had visions of growth into 
new markets and countries. As the company core strategy is to only supply green energy, they 
buy renewable electricity certificates in addition to the normal spot price of electricity. 
Moreover, they offered reduced prices on cultural products as well as free subscriptions on a 
monthly magazine to all their customers. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the company’s 
prices include a small premium to cover these extra costs compared to competitors that do not 
offer renewable energy and these services. K&K also claimed their customer was willing to 
pay for this. According to the company, their customers chose them because of the 
competitive prices and their eco friendly services and products (Troms Kraft, 2011). 
 
However, the revenue contributions from the activities in culture only constituted 3.4% of 
total income in 2010, representing an insignificant amount. As the industry is characterized by 
price competition it also seems peculiar to invest significant amounts in culture. Moreover, it 




also sounds like a bad investment, considering that 70% of the customer base is municipal 
enterprises that typically only base their decision on price. Moreover, the prices did not reflect 
that they offered such services. This is also evident after the fraud was uncovered, as it 
appears numbers of the culture segment were manipulated to show positive results (Ernst & 
Young AB, 2012). Recently, the company also decided to phase out the products and services 
relating to culture (Troms Kraft, 2012). The company’s strategy was not to be the price 
leader, but in reality the companies offered very competitive prices, and often lower than what 
their competitor offered. This was the reason the company won many auctions at Kundkraft.3 
Because of their extremely low prices, they won many fixed price contracts with 
municipalities. Consequently, it seems as the company followed a price leadership strategy.  
 
To conclude, the business strategy of K&K was not reasonable, given the limited ability of 
customers to differentiate electricity, and the fact that competition is based on price. First of 
all, providing customers with culture seems to be very inefficient – as they seemingly cannot 
charge their customers with higher prices anyway. Second of all, as margins on electricity 
typically is low, a high volume is essential to cover other costs and to make a decent profit in 
the industry. The company was able to reach a high growth in volume, by offering extremely 
low prices. This might be a sign that the company offered too low prices, meaning that they 
actually were losing money on the contracts. What is more, their prices did not reflect the fact 
that they were offering additional services and renewable energy.  
8.3 Financial Statement Analysis  
The financial statements in K&K for the years of 2002 to 2010 had not been representative 
and failed to represent a true and fair picture of the financial position of the company. The 
company had recorded fictitious revenues of 1.5 billion NOK over the years. In the following, 
the company’s financial information is analyzed with the intention to find overall trends, and 
red flags that could indicate EM.  
8.3.1 Income statement 
To easier see the development over time, the ratio to operating income is showed for each 
single line item in the income statement. This also facilitates comparison to industry peers in a 
                                                 
3 Kundkraft is a Swedish company that hosts auctions for suppliers of electricity. The supplier with the lowest 
bid wins the contracts. 
44   
 
 
meaningful way. The peer companies used in the comparison4 include Modity trading AB, 
Storuman Energi AB, Telge Energi AB, Fortum and Godel. The yearly growth is shown for 
operating income. 
 
Table 2: Income statement Kraft & Kultur 2007 – 2010 (Extracted and amended from the annual report) 
Operating income  
The first thing to notice when looking at the income statement, is that growth in operating 
income has accelerated from a high growth of 18% in 2008, to an unbelievable increase of 
74% in 2010. The average yearly growth is 34%. It is quite unusual to see such high growth 
numbers in an industry characterized by high competition and price pressure. Thus, these 
growth numbers represent a red flag as such high growth levels are not sustainable in the long 
run. In order to analyze the cause of the growth, it is necessary to look at the size of delivered 
volume. The delivered volume can be seen in Table 2 below.   
                                                 
4 The peer percentages is based on financial statement numbers for 2010 and are calculated based on the average 
percentage of income for the respective companies.  
INCOME STATMENT 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average Trend Peer
in 1000 SEK
Operating income 1 000 167 18 % 1 297 722 30 % 1 513 623 17 % 2 629 304 74 % 34 %
Cost of purchased goods -884 819 88 % -1 139 615 88 % -1 317 495 87 % -2 285 471 87 % 88 % 97,4 %
Other external costs -41 770 4 % -56 802 4 % -75 386 5 % -120 945 5 % 5 %
Wages and salaries -13 747 1 % -16 651 1 % -26 390 2 % -39 486 2 % 1 %
Depreciation -263 0 % -2 810 0 % -3 504 0 % -5 081 0 % 0 %
Other operating expenses 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % -3 078 0 % 0 %
Total -940 599 94 % -1 215 878 94 % -1 422 775 94 % -2 454 061 93 % 94 %
Operating profit 59 568 6 % 81 844 6 % 90 848 6 % 175 243 7 % 6 % 0,3 %
Financial income 1 305 0 % 3 016 0 % 642 0 % 436 0 % 0 %
Financial expenditure -24 484 -2 % -34 866 -3 % -24 562 -2 % -32 648 -1 % -2 %
Interest paid -4 505 0 % -5 756 0 % -800 0 % 0 0 % 0 %
Financial items, net -27 684 -3 % -37 606 -3 % -24 720 -2 % -32 212 -1 % -2 %
Profit before taxes 31 884 3 % 44 238 3 % 66 128 4 % 143 031 5 % 4 % 0,1 %
Amortisation -1 196 0 % -12 061 -1 % -17 689 -1 % 1 115 0 % -1 %
Taxes -9 158 -1 % -10 093 -1 % -13 413 -1 % -38 275 -1 % -1 %
Annual profit 21 530 2 % 22 084 2 % 35 026 2 % 105 871 4 % 3 % -0,1 %





Table 3: Development in key figures in K&K from unadjusted reported numbers (own illustration, 2012) 
 
From 2009 to 2010, sales revenue grew from SEK 1.5 to 2.6 billion. In the same period 
delivered volume grew 40%, from 2315 to 3234 GWh which was the main driver behind the 
sales growth. An increase in prices also reinforced this development. A growth in volume of 
40 % is quite high, especially if the market itself is not growing in size, meaning that the 
company is increasing its market share. The large volume increase might indicate that the 
company is increasing the market share at the expense of competitors, which in turn is a sign 
that the company is charging to low prices. increase in volume can be the result of either 
growth in market share (increased customer base) or increased consumption per customer 
(e.g. due to a cold winter). 
 
When looking at average sales price (Total sales/revenue), revenue seem to increase 
proportionally with delivered volume until 2007. From 2007 to 2010, a price increase of 40 % 
(0.49 to 0.68 SEK/ kWh) also has a significant effect. What is striking is that average prices 
seem to continually increase in the period.  
Operating margin 
Operating margin is the difference between the price offered to consumers and the market 
price, and shows how much of income is left to cover fixed costs and profit. Normally this 
ratio is very stable, so large increases or decreases in the ratio can represent a red flag. As the 
ratio is constant throughout the years at 12%5, there is no reason to be suspicious. As the 
industry is characterized by high price pressure, the operating margin should be similar in the 
industry. What might make the ratio vary somewhat between players in the industry are 
differences in product mix. Nevertheless, when comparing to competitors the company has an 
unexpectedly high margin as competitors have a margin of only 3%5 in 2010. 
                                                 









2003 1692 568         0,34
2004 1977 17 % 671         18 % 0,34
2005 1934 -2 % 728         8 % 0,36
2006 2122 10 % 850         17 % 0,38
2007 1995 -6 % 1 000       18 % 0,49
2008 2132 7 % 1 298       30 % 0,59
2009 2315 9 % 1 514       17 % 0,60
2010 3234 40 % 2 629       74 % 0,68
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8.3.2 Balance sheet 
 
Table 4: Balance sheet Kraft & Kultur 2007 – 2010 (Extracted and altered from the annual reports) Note: 
Provisions are classified as long term liabilities. 
The balance sheet is shown as a percentage balance sheet, meaning that each asset and 
liability is shown as a percentage of the total. This makes it easier to see alterations in the 
composition of assets or the methods of financing, when comparing numbers over the years. 
When looking at the balance sheet, the first thing to notice is that assets mainly consist of 
receivables and other current assets, while the share of fixed assets and inventory is low. This 
is one of the unique characteristics of the industry. The reason is that power cannot be stored 
and so power is produced and consumed at the same time. The most significant account on the 
balance sheet is accrued income, accounting for about 60% of total assets. 




Stock of goods for resale 4 895 0 % 8 636 1 % 13 983 1 % 17 431 1 % 1 %
Advances to suppliers 0 0 % 0 0 % 1 798 0 % 0 0 % 0 %
Accounts receivable from customers 292 089 30 % 380 716 30 % 447 024 26 % 691 611 27 % 28 %
Earned, not invoiced operating income 8 260 1 % 8 260 1 % 4 960 0 % 0 0 % 0 %
Receivables from group companies 13 300 1 % 7 590 1 % 4 054 0 % 43 471 2 % 1 %
Deferred tax asset 7 771 1 % 7 018 1 % 3 685 0 % 1 289 0 % 0 %
Other short-term receivables 628 0 % 1 745 0 % 3 873 0 % 16 924 1 % 0 %
Accrued income 509 924 52 % 745 081 58 % 991 847 57 % 1 638 073 63 % 57 % 13 %
Cash in hand, bank and giro account 86 228 9 % 53 013 4 % 147 736 8 % 66 599 3 % 6 %
Total current assets 923 095 94 % 1 212 059 94 % 1 618 960 93 % 2 475 398 95 % 94 %
FIXED ASSETS:
Trademarks 326 0 % 523 0 % 523 0 % 923 0 % 0 %
El certificates 51 023 5 % 66 681 5 % 97 422 6 % 92 565 4 % 5 %
Software 5 300 1 % 3 533 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 %
Other intangible assets 0 0 % 0 0 % 5 326 0 % 3 024 0 % 0 %
Total intangible assets 56 649 6 % 70 737 5 % 103 271 6 % 96 512 4 % 5 %
Inventores 4 627 0 % 3 813 0 % 4 500 0 % 7 187 0 % 0 %
Shares in subsidiaries 125 0 % 0 0 % 10 000 1 % 10 000 0 % 0 %
Deposits 2 000 0 % 2 000 0 % 2 000 0 % 0 0 % 0 %
Other financial assets 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 14 493 1 % 0 %
Total fixed assets 63 401 6 % 76 550 6 % 119 771 7 % 128 192 5 % 6 %
TOTAL ASSETS 986 496 100 % 1 288 609 100 % 1 738 731 100 % 2 603 590 100 % 100 %
EQUITY
Share capital 40 000 4 % 40 000 3 % 50 400 3 % 50 400 2 % 3 %
Legal reserve fund 27 000 3 % 27 000 2 % 27 000 2 % 27 000 1 % 2 %
Share premium account 0 0 % 0 0 % 79 054 5 % 79 054 3 % 2 %
Revalution reversal fund 99 265 10 % 120 795 9 % 142 880 8 % 167 083 6 % 9 %
Distributable equity (-uncovered losses 21 530 2 % 22 084 2 % 35 026 2 % 105 871 4 % 2 %
Total equity 187 795 19 % 209 879 16 % 334 360 19 % 429 408 16 % 18 %
SHORT TERM LIABILITIES
Bank overdraft 471 012 48 % 719 632 56 % 1 069 332 62 % 1 695 556 65 % 58 %
Accounts payable to suppliers 32 438 3 % 23 314 2 % 27 339 2 % 33 960 1 % 2 %
Payable tax 0 0 % 0 0 % 0 0 % 15 343 1 % 0 %
Payable to group companies 0 0 % 0 0 % 10 481 1 % 13 0 % 0 %
Other short term debt 131 897 13 % 127 394 10 % 122 213 7 % 234 518 9 % 10 %
Accrued costs and deffered income 12 475 1 % 8 363 1 % 21 998 1 % 23 004 1 % 1 %
Provisions 60 200 6 % 97 287 8 % 122 033 7 % 141 900 5 % 7 %
Total short term liabilities 708 022 72 % 975 990 76 % 1 373 396 79 % 2 144 294 82 % 77 %
LONG TERM LIABILITIES
Other long term liabilities 90 679 9 % 102 740 8 % 30 875 2 % 29888 1 % 5 %
Total debt 798 701 81 % 1 078 730 84 % 1 404 271 81 % 2 174 182 84 % 82 %
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 986 496 100 % 1 288 609 100 % 1 738 631 100 % 2 603 590 100 % 100 %




Accrued Income  
A report written by the Group CFO in 2006 explains the process of calculating accrued 
income in Kraft & Kultur; an employee requests lists on customer level. Then, the invoiced 
consumption (by customer profile) is reconciled to the total delivered volume in the period. 
The difference between delivered and invoiced electricity is then recorded as revenue through 
valuing the volume based on the average invoiced price in the time period. The price will 
include administrative markups as well as revenue from energy certificates (Earnst & Young 
AB, 2012).  
 
Figure 6: Yearly development in accrued income in Kraft& Kultur from 2003 -2010 (own illustration, 2012) 
 
As seen in Figure 5, accrued income has steadily increased since the start of the company in 
2001. The account had an average growth of 34% each year between 2003 and 2010. In 2009, 
the company reported earned, not invoiced operating income of 1 billion which reportedly 
grew to 1.6 billion in 2010, a growth of 600 MSEK or 65%. If we look at the balance sheet, 
the account’s share of total assets is also increasing. The significant increase in the account is 
worrying, as it may be a sign of EM or point to problems in invoicing customers. The 
explanation can also be a steep increase in revenues, as accrued income is expected to grow 
proportionally to earnings. Consequently, it is necessary to compare it to total sales to see if 
the development is a cause for concern or not. The ratio to sales is shown in Table 5 below.  
 
As receivables usually track sales, we expect the account to have the same ratio to income, 
assuming credit terms are unchanged. In 2003, accrued income amounted to 40% of total 
sales and grew steadily until it made up 74% of total sales in 2010. In other words, the 
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majority of the company’s recorded income was not yet invoiced. This is alarming. From 
2007 to 2008 and 2009 the ratio to sales increased with 14% and 19% respectively, hence 
indicating that the account might be inflated.  
 
Table 5: Development in key figures from 2003 – 2010 (Own illustration, 2012) 
 
Since accrued income is an interim account, most of the accrued earnings should relate to the 
current year and not lag from previous years. Moreover, we expect accrued income to relate to 
income earned at year end. If income and consumption is more or less distributed evenly 
throughout the year, with some seasonal variations, it is natural that accrued income makes up 
10% to 50% of sales, depending on the frequency of invoicing. Looking at the ratio in 
2008(60%), 2009(71%) and 2010(74%), it seems that the main share of income is earned 
around year end or alternatively that customers are invoiced less than twice a year. When 
accrued income amounts to such a large part of total income this is a warning signal and 
should be investigated. According to the board, the large size of accrued income is mainly due 
to the fact that the Swedish municipalities, which account for the main part of their customer 
base, is invoiced once a quarter in arrears (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). This means that income 
from the last quarter is not invoiced at year end. If this was true, accrued income should equal 
25 % of total sales the same year, compared to the actual 74 %!  
 
 













Accrued in % 
of sales  
2003 568         300 225 188 % 40 %
2004 671         450 50 % 67 % 290 29 % 44 %
2005 728         490 9 % 67 % 366 26 % 52 %
2006 850         650 33 % 76 % 414 13 % 52 %
2007 1 000       811 25 % 81 % 509 23 % 52 %
2008 1 298       1136 40 % 88 % 745 46 % 60 %
2009 1 514       1448 27 % 96 % 990 33 % 71 %
2010 2 629       2347 62 % 89 % 1637 65 % 74 %




It is surprising that such a large share of consumption has not been invoiced when considering 
that the credit time of municipalities were four months. The company also explained that the 
estimate included additional revenues from customers that consume more than the maximum 
according to the contract and that these revenues were invoiced after year end (ibid). The 
company also claimed that the transition to AMR led to delays in invoicing as a large amount 
of customer data was incorrect. The sharp increase in the account from 2009 to 2010 was 
allegedly due to an unusual price increase together with increased number of customers. 
Although these reasons sound plausible, it does not justify the ratio of accrued income to sales 
of 74%. The increase in the accrual compared to sales definitely indicates that something is 
wrong.  
  
When looking at the company’s total receivables (including accrued income) these total 1.45 
billion in 2009, equaling 96% of total income. The same ratio is 88% in 2008. In 2010, the 
size of total receivables is 2.35 billion SEK compared to 2.63 billion in total sales. This is a 
serious cause of concern. Accrued income on average constituted 70% of total receivables6.  
Working capital  
As the company grew, so did the need to invest in working capital due to the long credit time 
of customers. Working capital is a measure of the company’s liquidity or the capital available 
to the daily operations. Working capital is defined as current assets less short term debt and 
can be seen in the table below. There are no indications of liquidity problems, as working 
capital is positive and slowly increasing. The reason is that short term liabilities are rising in 
the same ratio as accrued income in the time period. In 2010, Kraft & Kultur had a total debt 
of 2.2 billion, of which more than 90 % was classified as short term. The bank overdraft 
constitutes the main part of short term liabilities, amounting to 1.6 billion SEK. The financial 
statement reports increases in the bank overdraft from 471 MSEK in 2007 to 1 700 MSEK in 
2010, equaling a yearly average increase of 50%. This is extremely high, even when 
considering the high growth the company experienced. The company reports positive results 
in the period, hence it does not make sense to increase bank overdraft with such a large 
amount.  
 
                                                 
6 Total receivables = Accounts receivable from customers + Accrued income + Other short-term receivables 
 




Table 6: Liquidity ratios (extracted from financial statements) 
Another measure of a company’s liquidity is the ratio of current assets to short term debt, 
which should be higher than 1.5, meaning that current assets should be 1.5 times higher than 
short term debt. Here, the ratio is below 1.5 and decreasing (Table 6), indicating that the 
company’s ability to meet their short term commitments is declining. The main reason for this 
is that investments are increasingly being financed using short term debt. As the share of 
receivables is increasing, this also negatively affects the liquidity of the company.  
8.3.3 Cash flow statement 
It is always useful to analyze a company’s cash flow, as it shows the discrete cash values of 
the company, hence is not subject to accounting assumptions. When looking at K&K’s cash 
flow statement, it does not match very well with the income statement. The company reported 
positive earnings and earnings growth each year, while the cash flow reveal a negative trend. 
From 2008 to 2010 the company had recurring negative net cash flow from operations. This is 
a red flag, as it could be an indication that customers are not able to pay, or that the income 
statement is artificially inflated. As this red flag is accompanied by rising accounts 
receivables as a percentage of sales – there is an obvious risk that income is overstated. 
 
When looking at the annual report in 2010, profit after tax is 106 MSEK, while cash from 
operations is 112 MSEK. But, when changes in current assets and debts are included, a 
negative result of 677 MSEK is derived. In 2009, the company appears to have incorrectly 
recorded an increase in the bank draft under cash from operations in the cash flow statement. 
Thus, cash from operations appear to be positive. When looking at the financial statement in 
2010, the error is corrected (Table 5 applies the changed numbers). Here, cash from 
operations after including changes in current assets and short term debt shows a negative 
result of 235 MSEK. If this was on purpose or not is hard to say, but it made the cash flow 
from operations look positive in 2009, while it in 2010 appeared that the cash flow from 
operations had improved. 
 
Normally a company that generates profits would also generate a positive cash flow from 
operations. However, if the company’s numbers are manipulated to show growth in earnings, 
Liquidity 2007 2008 2009 2010
Current assets/ Short term liabilities 1,30 1,24 1,18 1,15
Working capital 215 073           236 069   245 564      331 104          




it is obvious that the company will not receive any cash from this. Then, they need to finance 
their losses in other ways. The company’s large deficit in cash from operations relative to net 
income is a red flag, and provides a strong indication that something is wrong.  
 
 
Table 7: Cash flow statement Kraft & Kultur 2007 – 2010 (Extracted and changed from the annual report)  
Other key figures 
As the income statement might be manipulated to look normal it is suitable to also look at 
some key financial figures, as these might provide stronger indications if something is wrong. 
 
Table 8: Other key figures from 2007 – 2010 (Own illustration, 2012) 
CASH FLOW STATEMENT 2007 2008 2009 2010
in SEK 1000
CASH FROM OPERATIONS
Profit from operations 59 568 81 844 90 834 175 243
Adjustments for non cash items;
Depreciation 263 2 810 3 504 5 081
Provisions 6 778 37 087 24 746 19 867
Profits from operations after adjustments 66 609 121 741 119 084 200 191
Received interest 1 305 3 016 642 436
Paid interest -25 546 -39 081 -25 362 -32 648
Paid income tax -24 557 -9 340 -10 066 -56 014
Net cash flow from operations before change in WC 17 811      76 336         84 298          111 965          
CASH FROM CHANGES IN WORKING CAPITAL
Decrease/increase(+/-) of inventories -4 457 -3 741 -7 145 -1 650
Decrease/increase(+/-) of accounts receivables -53 382 -88 627 -66 308 -244 587
Decrease/increase(+/-) of receivables -86 108 -246 222 -269 743 -672 542
Decrease/increase(+/-) of accounts payable to supplier 16 180 -9 124 4 025 6 621
Decrease/increase(+/-) of current debt 158 954 238 464 18 936 122 734
Net change working capital 31 187 -109 250 -320 235 -789 424
Net cash flow from operations 48 998      -32 914        -235 937       -677 459         
INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Aquisition of subsidiary 0 0 -10 000 0
Aquisition of intangible assets -5 351 -197 -4 183 -1 439
Sale of finanncail assets 0 125 0 0
Aquisition of tangible assets -4 503 -229 -1 801 -4 436
Net cash flow from investments -9 854       -301            -15 984         -5 875            
FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Lending(-)/payback of finaincial payables 0 0 0 -12 493
Borrowing 0 0 349 700 626 224
Net cash flow from financing activities -            -              349 700        613 731          
NET INCREASE IN CASH 39 144 -33 215 97 779 -69 603
Key figures 2007 2008 2009 2010
Return on total capital 2 % 2 % 2 % 5 %
Equity ratio 19 % 16 % 19 % 16 %
Debt ratio 81 % 84 % 81 % 84 %
Short term debt ratio 89 % 90 % 98 % 99 %
Credit time accounts receivables - 93             98               78             
Credit time total receivables - 268 306 259
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Return on Total Capital = (Annual profit + Financial income)/Average Total Capital 
The return on capital is on stable level, but increases in 2010. The ratio is low, indicating that 
the company’s profitability is low.  
 
Financial structure 
The financial structure shows the company’s mixture of debt and equity, which directly 
affects the risk and value of the business. The equity and debt ratio measures how much of the 
firm’s assets that are funded by equity. The equity ratio shows a negative development, which 
could indicate that the company’s financial health is worsening. In 2010, almost all assets 
were financed using short term debt, mainly consisting of the bank overdraft. An increasing 
debt ratio increases the company’s exposure to interest rates and insolvency. The short term 
debt ratio also reveals that the size of short term debt relative to long term is increasing. The 
company’s capital structure does not seem to be optimal.  
 
Average credit time = Average receivables / (Total operating income / 360). 
The average credit time measures of how many days it takes the company to receive cash 
from the invoiced receivables and includes the time of meter reading, invoice time and credit 
time. The municipalities, accounting for 70% of the customer base, were invoiced on a 
quarterly basis and had one month credit time in addition. Hence, around 120 days seems 
reasonable, considering that this equals quarterly invoicing and a month credit time. The 
company’s high ratio is worrying. As this ratio is approaching 300 days, it means the 
company almost uses a year from income is earned to the company has received the cash. 
 
The quality of financial statement  
The overall quality of the company’s financial statement depends on the usefulness of 
financial information for the users. First of all, the financial reports never include any basis of 
comparison (last year’s numbers or budgeted numbers) before 2009, which made it hard for 
users to judge the performance of the company. Secondly, all reports lack supporting 
information on the financial situation and explanations on significant sizes. For instance, there 
is no explanation concerning the size of accrued income or how it is measured. Consequently, 
the estimate is difficult to understand and evaluate for an outsider. Thirdly, none of the reports 
include key statistics or figures of the company’s financial position and development. Forth, 
as financial statements were issued late on many occasions, information loses its value and 
relevance.  




The poor quality of the financial statement made it difficult to see the underlying development 
in earnings and the financial condition of the firm. The information should have been more 
detailed in order to be understandable for the users. Moreover, it is clear that the financial 
statement did not faithfully represent the company’s financial position and that information 
was not reliable.  
8.3.4 Conclusion 
In 2010, accrued income grew by almost 70%! The large increases in the account and the fact 
that the relative size of the account was significantly higher compared to competitors 
represent a red flag. Moreover, as accrued income normally track sales, the high growth of 
account receivables compared to accrued income is alarming. This discrepancy indicates that 
something is seriously wrong, either with the reported numbers or with the company’s ability 
to invoice customers. Moreover, there is an inconsistency between the cash flow and income 
statements as cash from operation are negative. This does not reflect the incredible growth 
and profitability shown in the income statement. This represents another red flag. This 
development can also be seen in the significant increase of bank overdraft, which seems to 
finance the negative cash flow. These facts should together have made the alarm go off with 
the board and auditor, as the income estimate was unrealistically high and inconsistent with 
the cash flow development.  
8.4 Fraudulent financial reporting  
In the following I provide my subjective interpretation of what happened in Kraft & Kultur, 
why management manipulated earnings and how. I base my evaluations on the financial 
statement, my knowledge of revenue recognition in the industry, EM theory and news paper 
articles from before and after the discovery of the fraud.  
Changed financial statement numbers  
The management in K&K allegedly managed to manipulate earnings over a long period, by 
recording fictitious earnings in the income statement by inflating the size of accrued income. 
By overstating revenues, the company’s showed too high profits every year as well as an 
inflated balance sheet. In the financial statement of 2011, the company restated sales revenue 
and costs for 2010. Sales revenues were reduced to by 650MSEK or 25%, while costs relating 
to purchases of electricity were increased with 283 MSEK or 12% from the originally 
reported numbers (Kraft & Kultur, 2011). Moreover, the accrued income was reduced 
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significantly, by almost 1500 MSEK a total reduction of 90%. Figure 7 shows the 
accumulated income in K&K from 2001 to 2010, and the size of accumulated manipulated 
income from year to year.  
 
Figure 8: Accumulated manipulated income K&K 2001- 2010 (Troms Kraft, 2011) 
As fictitious income needs to have a counter item in the balance sheet, Kraft & Kultur used 
the accrued income account to overstate their earnings year after year. Since the company 
never invoiced or received cash from these fictitious sales, the balance account only grew 
larger. Naturally, these sales will not increase cash flow from operations either and 
consequently the company had to increase their debt each year to finance the negative cash 
flow from operations. In other words, accrued income was the counter item for bank overdraft 
in the balance sheet, meaning that the bank overdraft financed accrued income.  
Estimating Accrued income  
As mentioned earlier, the main risk concerning the accrued income estimate is to precisely 
split the company’s total delivered volume to the different contracts. There is also a risk that 
total volume is wrong, but this risk is lower due to the fact that the company receives these 
volumes from the grid company. If volume was incorrectly estimated in K&K, the settlement 
of accounts with grid companies afterwards would reveal this. Moreover, the grid companies 
are pretty good at approximating the power supplier’s total volumes. It is therefore likely that 
the reported total volumes in K&K are accurate. A more reasonable explanation is that the 
company misstated earnings by using the wrong volume split in the revenue calculation so 
that the prices used in the calculation were wrong. Furthermore, management probably used 
incorrect prices on purpose when calculating the estimate to be able to show such high 




revenue numbers. The revised financial statement numbers from 2010 shows the same 
delivered volume as previous years which confirm this theory.  
 
Further, the accrued income account included large amounts of recorded revenue that related 
to previous accounting periods, meaning they should have been invoiced already. If this 
revenue was actually earned, the value of these revenues should have been questioned. In 
accordance with accounting standards the accrued income should be valued according to the 
amount of cash the company expects to receive. If the revenues were wrongly estimated, the 
accrued income should have been written down the following year. In addition, the estimate 
should have been modified in accordance with the updated assumptions.  
 
To conclude, the company managed to record fictitious income by recording too high accrued 
income on the balance sheet. The management probably used incorrect prices on contracts to 
accomplish this.  
Matching expenses   
When customers enter a fixed price deal, employees in K&K should immediately secure the 
price by calling the risk management department in Tromsø (Affarsvarlden, 2011). However, 
the internal investigation uncovered violations of these internal rules (Troms Kraft, 2011). In 
February 2010, a cold temperature together with low levels in water reservoirs and many 
closed nuclear power plants, made the price of electricity reach historical high levels 
(Affarsvarlden, 2011). The price on Nordpool was on average 92 cents per kWh, almost three 
times as high as the current price. As employees failed to hedge electricity prices for fixed 
price contracts, the company had large open positions in the market and was exposed to large 
price risk. According to Benulic, the company had short position on about two billion kWh, or 
half the volume in 2010 and 2011. As K&K supplied electricity to their customers at 0.41 
SEK per kWh, and employees failed to secure these positions, they lost whatever they paid 
above this price (Affarsvarlden, 2011).  
 
We paid spotprices. Had short positions. It hurts me to say it, but it is how it is. (Benulic, 2011) 
 
Benulics explanation sounds plausible, assuming that the internal controls were missing in 
this area or that employees lacked common sense. Benulic blame low effectiveness and 
quality of internal controls for the error (ibid).  
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It sounds reasonable that the company failed to secure fixed price contracts, but there might 
be other causes of this failure than low effectiveness of internal controls. As revenues were 
inflated over many years, there was only a matter of time until the fraud was uncovered. In 
order to cover up previous inflated earnings the company might have deliberately speculated 
on a price fall to increase revenues or reach budgeted earnings growth. In other words, there is 
a possibility that employees were told not to secure the price. When the spot prices increased, 
the company was forced to buy expensive electricity in the spot market. Furthermore, the 
many activities within culture and environment had in reality generated large costs that had 
not been appropriately matched with revenues in the financial statement (Ernst & Young AB, 
2012). To avoid showing these high costs and suffering a great loss, the company might have 
wrongfully activated these costs on the balance sheet under the accrued income account. As 
discussed above, capitalizing costs is one of the most used methods of earnings management.  
 
To conclude, it seems that the company deliberately failed to accurately record expenses of 
buying electricity in accordance with the matching principle. Moreover, by increasingly 
estimating a higher accrued income each year the company managed to show a smooth 
growth in earnings and a positive development in equity from year to year. As the income 
statement did not show any numbers that were particularly suspicious the fraud was harder to 
discover. However, the development shown in the income statement and balance sheet were 
not consistent with the situation illustrated by the cash flow from operations as this was 
negative. By comparing the accrued income account to sales the auditor and board should 
have been suspicious as this indicates that revenues were inflated. After having established 
the method management used to manipulate the financial statement, the environment that 
made the fraud possible will be analyzed.  
  




9. Environment  
In this chapter I try to identify factors in the company’s environment that increased the risk of 
fraud, such as the presence of incentives, weak internal controls and corporate culture. In 
other words, the circumstances that made EM and fraud possible in the company. 
9.1 Pressure 
Management and other employees have incentives or pressures to misstate the financial 
statement. The pressure to do whatever it takes to meet goals and the desire for personal gain 
are cited as the two most common reasons for fraud (Elder, et al., 2010).  
Weak control 
Benulic was one of the founders of K&K and was the CEO in the company from the start. He 
probably wanted to perform well in his job, considering that his reputation and career 
depended on the success of the company. As earnings and accrued income were overstated 
over many years, the misstatements probably started on a small scale, by stretching the rules. 
By preparing an aggressive estimate, the CEO was able to reach budgeted earnings – hoping 
that growth would increase revenues more than expected. When this did not happen, the 
company needed to continue to inflate earnings the next period to avoid showing a loss. This 
negative spiral then ended in fraud, although this probably was not the intention.  
 
Moreover, the company obviously struggled with their invoicing routines, as many customers 
complained on lacking invoices, wrong prices on invoices or wrong consumption (Jensen, 
2011). Early in 2011, the company was banned from Kundkraft, after topping the complaint 
list due to the lacking control of invoicing (Kjaergaard, 2010). This made the company lose 
about 30 000 customers (ibid). Moreover, the company’s employees failed to follow routines 
set by TK concerning securing prices on fixed price contracts, indicating that important 
internal controls in this area were weak or not present, which is a significant deficiency. 
Moreover, the company was not appropriately staffed, as the growth in customers and 
earnings had outgrown the organizational development (Table 1). This resulted in a lack of 
control of the company’s activities. The main reason why the CEO wanted to manage 
earnings might possibly be an attempt to cover up this lack of control.  
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Ambitious growth strategy  
As mentioned earlier, the company had an ambitious growth strategy. The CEO had strong 
visionary objectives, risk willingness and a desire to show growth in order to expand the 
business into both new geographical markets and new products. In an interview, Benulic 
envisioned himself as the CEO of Kraft & Kultur in New York, illustrating his desire to grow 
the company and run a large organization. The motivation to grow is what usually makes a 
good CEO. Due to the high competitive pressure the company had to offer extremely low 
prices in order to grow and outbid competitors. K&K’s competitors could not understand how 
the company was able to offer such low prices (DN, 2011). The CEO of Kundkraft says she 
could not understand how K&K were able to show above average profit numbers, considering 
that the company had problems invoicing their client and the fact that they offered low prices 
(Nordlys, 2011). Hence, management’s desire to grow might have represented an incentive to 
overstate earnings and growth numbers to meet budgeted earning goals. 
Expectations from parent company 
The management also faced pressure to meet parent company’s expectations. Press releases 
and annual reports from Troms Kraft were always overly optimistic and described Kraft & 
Kultur as a success story, due to the strong growth in revenues. Moreover, the parent 
company also supplied the company with a significant amount of capital over the years, and 
provided guarantees for their debt. This probably added to the pressure of covering up lack of 
control in the company and a desire to show above average performance. Management also 
faced pressures from other creditors, as the company had an excessive amount of short term 
debt. However, as the parent company was the guarantee of this debt, pressure from creditors 
were probably not as strong.  
Personal financial gain 
Another possible motive of earnings manipulation is the presence of performance based 
bonuses. The CEO’s bonus could amount up to three months of salary, equaling a maximum 
bonus of about 350 TSEK in 2010 (Kraft & Kultur, 2010). Whether or not this is an incentive 
for the CEO to manipulate earnings is hard to say. However, a potential or expected salary 
increase might have provided an incentive to manipulate earnings as Benulic’s total salary 
increased from SEK 970 000 to SEK 1.6 million when the company doubled their sales 
between 2008 and 2010 (Kraft & Kultur, 2011).  
 




In summary, there are many possible causes and reasons why management misstated financial 
statements. As creditor pressure and financial incentives were low – it might seem as the main 
motive was the CEO’s desire to grow the company and perform well on the job.  
9.2 Opportunity of fraud  
Significant accounting estimates  
The presence of a significant earnings estimate provided an opportunity to manage earnings. 
As accrued income is based on uncertain variables, such as total consumption, the volume 
split between contracts, and price, it is difficult for outsiders and auditors to judge the 
accuracy and reasonableness of the estimate. Hence, it is difficult to detect an overstated 
revenue estimate, without inside information. Moreover, key statistics and information on 
prices and volume were also lacking in financial statements, making calculations hard to 
verify for an outsider. Thus, management had the flexibility to manage the accrued income 
number.  
 
Moreover, as the organization grew and became increasingly complex the board faced an 
increasing challenge to understand and monitor the different business areas, including K&K’s 
business model. This made it difficult to analyze financial numbers and to ask critical 
questions, especially relating to the culture segment. This gave management an opportunity to 
manipulate results, which evidently they did (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). 
Internal controls 
It is management’s responsibility to design, implement and maintain internal controls over the 
accounting system. The objectives of an effective internal control system are usually 
operational effectives, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with laws and 
regulation (Elder, et al., 2010). Hence, having strong internal controls is important in 
preventing and detecting misstatements in the accounting system and financial statement. A 
key control procedure for the revenue process is segregation of duties (Stuart, 2011). In each 
business process the responsibilities concerning custody of assets, record keeping, 
authorization and reconciliation should be separated and handled by different employees. This 
way the company assurances that transactions are valid, accurately reported, in compliance 
with rules and regulations, in accordance with the company’s goals and objectives. An 
organization of K&K’s size has normally good quality on internal control routines. However, 
60   
 
 
the auditor in K&K frequently reported that internal controls were weak from the start in 
2002, and that delegation of responsibility in the organization (segregation of duty) was 
unclear (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). The CEO was in practice controlling a major portion of 
both the revenue and expenditure function and the one in charge of both the operational and 
record keeping responsibilities (ibid). Consequently, he had the power and opportunity to 
make inappropriate accounting entries. The CEO was the one who prepared the estimate, with 
the help of the CFO. Moreover, there company lacked controls concerning reconciling the 
estimate with total invoiced amounts and there were no approval of the estimate from the 
board or independent employees. The company never provided any statistics or numbers on 
the deviation of their estimate compared with actual invoiced amounts in the financial 
statement either. By doing this, the users could have assessed the historical accuracy of the 
estimate.  
 
From internal inspections the company also uncovered deficiencies in routines relating to 
hedging of electricity prices and considerable deficits in the customer portfolio, as it seems 
the company have not known or managed the profitability of customer contracts. Even though 
these deficiencies is not especially important relating to manipulation of accrued income, they 
illustrate the lack of control in the company – both concerning the management’s control and 
understanding of business and the board’s control over management. Moreover, the poor 
routines are evidence of a lack of tidiness from the administration. 
Competence and adequacy of employees 
Accounting services were outsourced to external consultants, who took care of the company’s 
daily bookkeeping of transactions. The company also used different internal resources as a 
part of the financial function (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). One of the company’s external 
consultants was Pierre Sjöö, who apparently had a central financial function in the company. 
Until 2008 Sjöö functioned as the CFO, and was involved in discussions on accrued income 
together with Benulic. In 2008, Helena Ridderstråle replaced Sjöö. Ridderstråle was 
responsible of invoicing customers, but was not involved in involved in the accounting of 
accrued income and was never present in meetings with the auditor (Ernst & Young AB, 
2012). Hiring a CFO at an earlier stage, would have been appropriate considering the 
aggressive growth strategy as well as for risk management purposes.  
 




The finance function never had a strong position. Benulic had the upper responsibility for the 
economy and administration from the start in 2001. In 2003 the board decided that Benulic 
was accountable for the company’s finances and the preparation of accounts. This 
responsibility was only supposed to last until the reporting routines were sufficiently working. 
However, in reality it lasted throughout the whole period. The board explained that this was 
due to a lack of potential candidates (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). The CEO he had a strong 
incentive not hire a CFO, as this would risk that the manipulation could be discovered. The 
financial competence and resources seem to be inadequate and limited until 2010 when a CFO 
was hired. However, Benulic continued to be involved in the preparation of accounts after 
2010. In addition, all reporting and contact with the auditor happened via the CEO.  
 
To sum up, the administration in K&K was dominated by the CEO, who was responsible to 
report financial statement numbers. The existence of a significant earnings estimate, together 
with inadequate controls over financial reporting provided the perfect conditions for fraud. 
With stronger internal controls in place, aimed at mitigating the risk of EM in the estimate the 
fraud could possibly have been prevented or detected at an earlier stage.  
9.3 Rationalization 
Management’s integrity and attitude 
The attitude and personal values of management affect both the culture in an organization and 
the likelihood that fraud occurs. Management integrity and ethical behavior is important to 
create a culture with honesty and ethical behavior, which in turn creates a good control 
environment. A dishonest manager with low morale on the other hand, can create an 
unwanted culture where EM and fraud are justified.   
 
Benulic is a well known in Sweden, because of his career background as a journalist, news 
reporter, editor and his involvement in politics. He is a competent and intellectual person, and 
is good at debating. TK ascribed a great deal of the success and growth to the skills and 
leadership of Benulic, and described him as the brains behind the operations (Sæbbe, 2005). 
He was described as confident and strong personality by both people in the company and 
outsiders (ibid). When answering to the media on questions relating to the fraud, he is 
extremely calm and eloquent, which he also points out himself. He had a management style 
with strong drive and personal opinions. This can both be positive – as a leader who inspires 
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and sets high goals, and negative – as an authoritarian leader with bad cooperating skills and 
who is domineering. Benulic’s authoritarian management style is illustrated in an incident 
when the Group auditor (PwC) addressed the size of accrued income where he answered in an 
aggressive and rude tone. He even accused the auditor of lacking competence and knowledge 
(Ernst & Young AB, 2012). The CEO exercised a great deal of power and influence in the 
company and was also the central decision maker in the fraud. His position and authority 
could also have facilitated the involvement of other employees, and emails from Benulic 
provided instructions to his accomplices on how to manipulate accounting numbers;  
[..] Concerning culture – can you manipulate the numbers so that we end up with a positive result of 1.4 
MSEK – for example by adding the amount to inventory or accrued income [..] Electricity income – take 
a sum that makes us end up at 16.1 MSEK in profit after taxes. (Ernst & Young AB, 2012, p. 10) 
 
It also appears that the CEO had a great deal of power over the board, as they believed his 
explanations and did not question his integrity. Even though the CEO did not provide them 
with the information they requested, they never considered to fire him. It is clear that the CEO 
did not want any interference from the board, as the board’s access to information was 
restricted, indicating that the CEO wanted to keep things hidden from the owners.  
Conclusion  
The company’s management wanted to meet budgeted earnings and growth numbers, but 
lacked control of the company. Moreover, the company also faced pressure to perform from 
the outside and owners. The existence of a significant revenue estimate provided an 
opportunity to inflate earnings and receivables. Furthermore, the CEO exercised a strong 
control over company decisions which means he was in a unique position to manage earnings 
numbers. The company lacked controls that could compensate for this fact. Hence, both the 
opportunity and motive to commit fraud existed. The presences of these conditions are 
obvious risk factors of fraud, but ultimately, it was the CEO’s personal values and attitude 
that made him commit fraud.  
 
Both the auditor and the board of directors should have been aware that these risk factors 
existed in the company. However, it is evident that the board lacked oversight over the 
financial reporting process and that the monitoring of management was ineffective. The next 
two sections will deal with the auditor’s and the board’s responsibility and liability to detect 
fraud. Based on the information in the report by Ernst & Young I will evaluate whether the 
auditor or the board could have been expected to detect the fraud at an earlier time. 




10. The Auditor’s responsibilities 
The Norwegian Corporation Law (aksjelov) and the Accounting Act places the primary 
responsibility for fraud prevention with the company management. However, there also rests 
a great responsibility on the auditor to detect and prevent financial statement misstatements. 
The auditor is required to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement (International Auditing Standard IAS 8), but cannot be expected to 
obtain absolute assurance that financial statements are without material misstatements. Grant 
Thornton (GT) was the auditor of Kraft & Kultur from 2003 to 2011, while 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is the auditor of the parent company (Troms Kraft AS). 
10.1 Grant Thornton 
The auditor reported errors of an administrative art to the board on several occasions, 
including missing control statements and employment contract for the CEO and other 
employees. The auditor also reported more serious cases to the board, as the company 
consistently failed to pay taxes and other liabilities on time. This resulted in comments in the 
audit report more than one time. The financial reports were also delayed a number of times, 
consequently the accounts were not finished in time for the auditor to complete an efficient 
audit (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). Furthermore, the auditor revealed violations of the Swedish 
Accounting Act, when they found invoices relating to January that were not recorded in 
February. Together, these incidences should have made the auditor question the honesty and 
competence of management.  
Accrued income 
As the accrued income estimate can be quite a complex calculation, it is difficult for the 
auditor to evaluate the size of this account. Naturally, management has more information and 
competence of the different inputs that affects the estimate. However, the auditor has to 
critically assess if the size of the item seems reasonable, by looking at how accurate the 
estimate have been historically in addition to inquiring management. In this case, it might 
seem as the auditor was lead astray by management, as the auditor seem to have relied on the 
explanations from management. It is important that the auditor does not blindly trust and 
accept explanations provided by management (professional skepticism) and that the auditor 
finds supporting and corroborating evidence (ISA 500).  
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Bearing in mind that accrued income was a significant estimate and also a large relative size 
of the balance sheet, the auditor knew that the risk associated with this account was high. 
Consequently, the account should have been thoroughly reviewed and examined to get the 
necessary assurance that financial statements and earnings estimates were accurate. Moreover, 
the auditor has a responsibility to analyze the company’s calculations and assess the 
reasonableness of these accounts. However, there were several years the auditor did not 
review accrued income, with the explanation that the audit was carried out too early in the 
year. The auditor should have done it subsequently and should also have done it for the 
previous years as the auditor also is required to review prior year’s significant accounting 
estimates (ISA 240.32b). The fact that the auditor did not review this estimate every year is 
critical, and indicates that the auditor failed to execute his responsibilities satisfactory.  
 
In some years the auditor reviewed the account during the year, and investigated how much of 
the amount that had been invoiced. In 2009 the auditor mentioned that only 12% of accrued 
income at year end in 2008 was billed per 19.02.09 (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). This seems to 
be quite low, but the auditor did not comment any further on the size. In June the same year, 
the auditor said that 114 MSEK of accrued revenue related to earnings in 2007. Half a year 
later, in December, this amount was still the same (ibid)! Nevertheless, the auditor reported 
that the size of the account were in accordance with GAAP and did not even comment on the 
possibility that accrued income could be overstated. This is a significant issue, as 114MSEK 
is quite significant the auditor should have required management to make an adjusting entry 
or should otherwise made a remark in the audit opinion.  
Quality of audit evidence 
The circumstances indicate that most of the auditing happened through email correspondence 
with Benulic (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). There are also a lot of referencing in the audit 
documentation to telephone conferences and mail, which seemed to be how the auditor got 
evidence and explanations. Another complicating fact is that the CEO is provides requested 
documentation late, and occasionally sends the wrong information. He also gives the auditor 
short time restrictions to deliver work, which unavoidably reduces the quality of the auditors 
work. In the audit of the 2010 financial statements, K&K were not done with the closing 
procedures when the audit started in May 2011. Because of the large amount and extent of 
emails, and the fact evidence and explanations is sent piece by piece it is difficult to keep 
track of what evidence is received and not. Moreover, it was always the CEO who had contact 




and meetings with the auditor and provided documentation (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). The 
fact that the CEO spent his time on finding documentation for the auditor is quite unusual, and 
is a sign that the CEO had something to hide. 
 
The circumstances indicate that it is questionable that the auditor possessed the required 
competence and resources to perform the audit. First of all, the auditor did not have previous 
experience in auditing clients in the power industry. Moreover, the auditor did not comment 
on the significant increase of accrued revenue in 2008, 2009 and 2010, even though both the 
absolute amount and ratio to sale is noteworthy and irregularly high. Moreover, they seem to 
lack sufficient and reliable information to base their audit opinion on. If this was the case they 
should have considered not continuing auditing the client. On the other hand, the report 
indicates that the manipulations include false invoices with K&K’s subsidiaries and other 
associated companies (ibid). If this is the case, it is almost impossible for an auditor to 
discover fraud. 
10.2 The Group auditor (PwC) 
As the Group auditor of Troms Kraft, this places certain responsibilities on PwC to carry out 
certain controls relating to the local auditor. In 2009, the CEO of TK, who also was the 
chairman of the board in K&K, requested a separate review from PwC concerning risk factors 
in the revenue process, including the completeness of revenues and existence of receivables. 
The Group wanted a complete report, with a conclusion on whether GT had adequately 
audited the identified risks. PwC concentrated on the risk analysis and investigation on 
accrued income and receivables performed by GT earlier that year. They noted that GT had 
performed different tests to confirm the size of the account over the years. Most importantly, 
GT had sent external confirmations to customers to assure that the outstanding amount in the 
financial statement was accurate.   
 
Confirmation of customer balances is the most important test to determine the existence of 
recorded accounts receivable and provides reliable evidence (Stuart, 2011). Auditing 
standards require that the auditor perform this test or document their justification of not doing 
so (Elder, et al., 2010). When GT performed the test, the response rate was 60% (Ernst & 
Young AB, 2012). The auditing standards require the auditor to perform follow up procedures 
on the non responding customers. It is common to send second and third request, or to 
perform alternative procedures if this is not effective. An alternative procedure is to examine 
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supporting documentation to determine whether cash was collected (Elder, et al., 2010). Due 
to the weak controls in K&K and the significant size of accrued income and receivables, 
follow up procedures on non replying customers are especially important. However, there is 
no evidence that such procedures were done and therefore it is difficult to judge how much 
assurance the auditor got on the existence and accuracy of the amount. Nevertheless, PwC 
concluded that GT had performed the audit work in accordance with the auditing standards  
(Ernst & Young AB, 2012).  
 
PwC called attention to accrued income early in 2006, and pointed out the CEO’s failure to 
separate accounts receivables from this estimate. The CEO seems to lack an understanding of 
this estimate, even though he was the one who prepared it. PwC forwarded an email from the 
CEO and his concerns to the board members in TK. At the same time, the board requested 
information on the calculation of accrued income, but management failed to deliver this. Later 
the same year PwC investigated the size together with the Group CFO without any significant 
findings. Moreover, the auditor requested better routines concerning the accrued income 
estimate as there was no approval of this estimates by the board or an independent employee 
(ibid). In April 2010, PwC investigated the size again, with the same results. 
10.3 Conclusion 
It is difficult to conclude whether the auditors performed their responsibility as auditors 
without all the facts. On one hand, GT were facing unreasonable time demands from 
management and were in addition presented wrongful information. This makes it particularly 
difficult to perform an audit of high quality and detect misstatements. Moreover, the auditor 
cannot be expected to examine the vast amounts of customer balances the company had. 
 
On the other hand, an experienced and knowledgeable audit team should have questioned and 
investigated the large size of accrued income, and the unexpectedly high relative size of this 
account to earnings. This makes me question the competence of the audit team, as they should 
have been able to discover these discrepancies. Moreover, there is no evidence that GT 
performed subsequent procedures on the non responding customers. Such external 
confirmations are critical in order to get comfort on the existence and accuracy of the account. 
This raises doubts concerning the quality of GT’s work. Furthermore, as the main part of the 
audit seems to have been done via email correspondence, this would necessary reduce the 
quality of the audit correspondingly. A lack of resources might be another plausible 




explanation. Moreover, an explanation from the CEO does not provide enough evidence and 
the auditor should have evaluated the reliability of his explanation and should have used 
professional skepticism. This way they would have recognized the possibility of fraud in the 
company. Consequently, it is difficult to understand how the auditors could have obtained 
assurance on the reliability of the financial statement numbers this way. The quality of the 
audit was not good enough, and the circumstances indicate that GT should have detected the 
fraud earlier.  
 
PwC asked relevant control questions and assed the size of accrued income as a risk and also 
investigated the size multiple times together with management. They continuously reported 
on weak internal controls concerning both accrued income and other routines and highlighted 
the lack of segregation of duties. The auditor seems to rightly recognize the risk of material 
misstatements due to fraud, but was unable to uncover the fraud. As a group auditor, PwC had 
to rely on the evidence and the controls performed by GT.  
11 The Board’s responsibilities 
11.1 The Board of K&K 
The board had on average eight meetings a year from 2001 to 2011, all with high attendance. 
Except for a short period from 2005 to 2007, the board consisted of employees from K&K or 
TK (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). From 2001 to 2005, the former CEO was also a member of 
the board, while the deputy CEO was a member from 2001 to 2008. The CEO always decided 
the agenda for board meetings. One external member was hired in 2005, but no one replaced 
him from 2007. Hiring external members was a topic on many board meetings and although 
multiple candidates were identified, no one was hired. From 2007, owners of TK were 
represented on the board (Ernst & Young AB, 2012). These had competences in power, but 
were not familiar with the Swedish market and had no competence in culture. In 2008, the 
Group CFO and deputy CEO became members of the board in K&K, both had long 
experience within finance, accounting and auditing. In 2010, the CEO in TK, Oddbjørn Schei, 
was appointed chairman in the board of K&K. 
 
No measures were taken to reduce the accrued income account until 2011. The auditor also 
commented on the poor quality of documentation of accrued income and continuously 
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requested better routines relating to this account. Even though this represented a significant 
risk, there are no indications that the board questioned the existence of accrued income.  
 
Directors expressed concern with the quality of reports and supporting documentation in 
board meetings. Supporting documentation was sent management to the board in emails and 
sometimes handed out at meetings. According to the board minutes, the CEO had the upper 
responsibility that financial reports were adequate and functioned as the CFO until 2010. 
Hiring a CFO was discussed at many board meetings. GT pointed at significant control 
deficiencies in the company and how it affected their audit from 2001 to 2005. In 2008 the 
board requested the GT to examine internal controls, but this did not result in any findings. In 
2009, the auditor identified reconciliation differences and reported this control deficiency to 
the board. The auditor also reported that the separation of duties in the company was blurred.  
Discussion 
Board composition and diversity 
The fact that K&K had many internal members on the board was probably advantageous, as 
members were better able to supervise the daily management of the company due to 
experience and knowledge of the operations and business. On the other hand, having only 
internal members increases the possibility that discussions and decisions happens outside the 
board room and that decisions are influenced by personal interests. In addition, internal 
members are more likely to approve management’s decisions and less likely to be critical. 
Independent board members on the other hand are more likely to be objective and therefore 
more efficient in monitoring management. Moreover, there is a risk that groupthink may have 
impacted the decision making process in K&K, a situation where members try to minimize 
conflict and strive to reach consensus (Thomsen & Conyon, 2011). This way, critical thoughts 
and realistic assessments might have been overridden. As the company seemingly was very 
successful, and since the CEO was a strong individual, it was probably difficult to raise 
critical questions. It takes competence and courage to be critical of a visionary and strong 
CEO or chairman. Consequently, the composition of the board was not optimal to monitor 
management. 
 
Further, the board had a lot of competence in power, but lacked competence in culture, 
business and finance. Without the necessary competence, the board members could not be 




expected to fully understand the business model and risk and the numbers in the financial 
statements. In other words how the different accounts are connected and the risks associated 
with the different accounts. It is the owner’s responsibility to elect the members of the board, 
but in this case they failed to create a board with the necessary competence to detect 
irregularities in the financial statement. The financial competence in the board was limited 
until 2008, when the Group CEO and deputy CEO became members. Other newly elected 
members also had more competence in these areas compared to previous years. From this 
point on, the board should have had the necessary competences and ability to understand and 
independently analyze the financial position of the firm, including the large size of accrued 
income!  
Board activity and Follow-up 
Some issues are on the agenda several times, without any evidence of follow up at later board 
meetings. In 2007 the board started logging all decisions to make sure they were followed up, 
but the log disappeared after only a short time period. The most critical failure to follow up is 
on requests to the CEO on a specification of income calculations in 2008 and discussions to 
hire a CFO. Moreover, as the board was presented quarterly financial reports, they had the 
necessary information to follow up the increasing size of accrued income and receivables. 
Hence, even though the board had a high activity level in the period, the follow-up of board 
decisions seems poor and insufficient. The board also failed to react to the reported internal 
control deficiencies with corrective actions. Although control deficiencies do not indicate that 
anything is wrong in the financial statements, they are important to secure the accuracy of the 
financial statements. Moreover, the board had a duty to ensure that the company’s accounts 
were subject to adequate controls. Even though the auditors reported that internal controls 
were weak concerning the revenue process, the CEO was responsible to prepare the accounts 
up until 2010. The board should have made sure the company had appropriate segregation of 
duties by ensuring that a CFO was hired. Consequently, the board failed to fulfill their 
responsibilities and could therefore be held accountable that the fraud was not discovered 
earlier.  
Financial reporting to the board 
As mentioned earlier, the financial reports of K&K were of poor quality. Moreover, 
management restricted the board’s access to documents by not providing requested 
documentation, or providing documents late. This probably made it hard to keep track of what 
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information was missing and to get an overview. Moreover, all emails from the CEO to the 
board concerning financial results were consistently positive - even the increase in accrued 
income was portrayed this way, claiming that the relative increase against growth in 
customers actually corresponded to a decrease in outstanding (Ernst & Young AB, 2012).  
 
The board has an independent responsibility to do research. However, analysis of cash flows 
and profitability is almost absent in board meetings. From 2008, this is still the case, even 
though the board now had the necessary resources and financial competence. It is surprising 
that the board did not focus on improving cash flow or question why the cash flows from 
operations were negative at the same time they had positive earnings. The recurring negative 
cash flow is an obvious indication of poor routines and control, and could also indicate that 
the financial state of the firm was in a bad place. The board did not see the red flags. The 
board should have performed peer analyses and questioned the size of accrued income at an 
earlier point instead trusting the explanations of the CEO. Moreover, when the auditor 
reported that f 114 MSEK of income relating to 2007 was not invoiced yet in 2009, they 
should have investigated the matter and dug deeper to find the case why earnings relating to 
previous years were not invoiced and did not appear in the bank account. This is especially 
true since they were aware of the risk associated with the account. Instead, the board was 
occupied with discussing growth possibilities and expansion into new markets and to new 
products (Ernst & Young AB, 2012).  
 
The board failed to fulfill their responsibility to make sure controls in the revenue process 
were adequate, as the CEO was the one both in charge of bookkeeping and preparing the 
financial statements and income estimate. Thus, the board failed to prevent the fraud. 
Considering that the board had the necessary financial resources from 2008, it is reasonable to 
criticize the board for not seeing and acting on the red flags in the financial statements. They 
should have performed analyses and investigated the size of accrued income already at this 
point as they were aware of the risk associated with the account. This way they could have 
detected the fraud earlier. To conclude, the board did not assure that information reflected the 
real financial position of the firm and should have prevented and detected the fraud earlier.  
11.2 The board of Troms Kraft  
K&K contributed with half of the Group’s revenues in 2010, and the company was described 
as a great success (Troms Kraft, 2011). As the company continued to diversify into new 




business areas, the complexity increased and the board faced an increasing challenge to 
understand the different business areas of its subsidiaries. The composition of the board was 
diverse and directors had competence both in power, finance and business, which was quite 
different from the board of K&K. The board discussed several matters concerning K&K in 
this period, such as the high working capital, the long credit time and the lacking financial 
competence in the company. The board also discussed the company’s poor invoicing routines 
on multiple occasions and requested both the board and management in K&K to carefully 
watch the invoicing routines. In the following, I will present significant findings in the 
external report from Ernst & Young (2012) and discuss the implications of these findings. 
Accrued income 
The board discussed the size of accrued income as a separate topic on a board meeting in 
2006, were the CEO informed that all sales relating to 2003 and 2004 had been invoiced. 
Further, the CEO blamed grid operators for the slow invoicing process as reports on meter 
readings arrived late. In 2006 the CFO and Group CFO together with PwC visited K&K to 
map how different risk was handled in the audit of the company. Afterwards, a report 
documenting the visit was distributed to the board in TK, including GT’s assessment of risk 
factors in the company. The report concludes that GT was content with the level of 
segregation of duties in the revenue process, but that roles and responsibilities were not 
clearly defined. The report also states that the large size of accrued income was a result of 
both long invoicing periods and distinctive Swedish conditions.  
 
The board expressed concern for the significant increase in accrued income in 2007, as they 
assumed credit risk was increased due to an increasing amount of private customers. 
Management ensured that the risk associated with these sales was low, as the largest source of 
revenue still came from municipalities. The board emphasized the importance of internal 
controls in this area, due to the considerable effect on earnings. The increasing size of the 
account continued to be a topic on board meetings the following years as they were worried 
that the valuation was incorrect. In 2010, the chairman questioned the significant size of 
accrued income compared to competitors (Energibolaget), and received an aggressive and 
rude reply from the CEO, explaining that the difference was due to the many municipalities in 
K&K’s customer base.  
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Issues relating to invoicing routines were brought to the board’s attention early in 2011, and 
actions were taken to reduce the amount of accrued income and receivables. However, the 
CEO was unsuccessful in reducing the outstanding amount. Shortly after, the board received 
an internal notice from employees in Sweden concerning the reality of the size of accrued 
income. The board then reacted and called an extraordinary meeting. The explanation the 
board received from the CEO at this point was not perceived as credible. As a response, the 
board initiated internal investigations to map cash flows in the company and this was when 
the accounting irregularities and alleged fraud was uncovered.  
Discussion 
Like the board in K&K, the board in TK also failed to follow up on issues in the company. A 
plausible explanation is a shortage of time at board meetings. In addition to the time 
constraint, the board also noted that information and financial reports often came late, which 
limited the board’s ability to analyze and discuss issues.  
 
The report from 2006 does not discuss the possibility that the accrued income estimate could 
be wrong or the risk of misstatement due to both errors and fraud. Thus, the board could not 
be expected to understand the risks associated with accrued income and internal controls 
based on information in the report alone and detect the fraud at this point. On the other side, 
the board should have been familiar with the risks associated with revenues and should 
therefore have ensured that appropriate controls were implemented in the revenue process. 
The board neglected their responsibilities to make sure financial statements were accurate, 
and placed too much responsibility with management. The CEO had his own interest to be in 
charge of the preparation of accounts and accrued income, which explains why a CFO was 
not hired until 2010.   
 
It looks like the board focused too much on the top line and growth in revenues when they 
should have been concerned with the company’s negative cash flow and increasing debt. 
Although the increasing size of accrued income was a topic on meetings, there are no signs 
that required measures were taken to reduce the account or investigate the existence of these 
amounts. As accrued income is above what can reasonably be expected in the industry, the 
board should have investigated and mapped the cash flows earlier, as there were plenty of 
warning flags. Compared to the board in K&K, the board in TK actually had the necessary 
knowledge and financial capabilities to understand and analyze both risk factors and the 




financial development in the firm. One possible explanation might be that they had too much 
trust and faith in the CEO. Even though the board assessed the size of the account, they 
believe the CEO’s explanations and did not investigate the existence of the account until 
2011. In 2008 the company reported the size of accrued income to be 1 billion, amounting to 
60% of sales and equaling an increase of 46% from previous year. The development in cash 
flow was also negative on the second year in a row. These warning signals should have been 
followed up and investigated already at this point. The hypothesis that accrued income was 
significantly different due to the Swedish market conditions, could have easily been rejected 
if the board had done a peer analysis on the size of accrued income. The fact that operations 
were located in different countries probably made it difficult for the board to keep itself 
informed but should nevertheless have seen the warning signs in the financial statement, as 
accrued income was significantly increasing compared to sales.  
 
Furthermore, as the Group went through a series of changes during the period, this probably 
required much attention and resources from top management, leaving less time for follow-up 
and control of K&K. This provided a chance for management to behave opportunistically; as 
the company was not closely monitored they could do as they pleased. 
11.3 Conclusion  
The board has a responsibility to review and analyze the company’s calculations and 
estimations and assess the reasonableness of these calculations to make sure financial 
statements are accurate and reflect the real financial position of the firm. As the development 
in accrued income account and financial ratios showed many warning signs, one would think 
they at some point would discover the errors as they have a duty to investigate irregularities.  
 
The board in K&K had knowledge in power industry, but did not have enough financial 
knowledge to independently analyze financial statements and understand the development in 
critical ratios. Hence, the board could not have been expected to understand the underlying 
information in the financial statements. However, the board is responsible to obtain 
information in a manner they can understand so this is a poor excuse. The CEO presented 
documentation the board found to be reasonable and true to support the results, financial 
situation and accounts of the company. The board therefore claims they had no possibility to 
uncover the fraud as they were misled and manipulated by the administration. However, the 
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board is supposed to be critical of the management, but seems to blindly trust the CEO’s 
judgment and honesty. 
 
Moreover, the board failed to identify fraud risks on a timely basis and to adequately monitor 
identified risks. For instance, the company lacked satisfactory internal controls in the revenue 
process, a serious weakness considering the large size of the firm and the presence of a 
dominant leader. In reality there were no separate CFO role in the company, and the CEO 
functioned as a CFO until 2010. The board should have made sure that management hired an 
external CFO at an earlier stage, hence both boards failed to make sure the appropriate 
mechanisms were in place to prevent EM and fraud. By implementing controls to the 
identified fraud risks, the board could have limited the opportunity to commit fraud. Instead, 
the board consistently failed to follow up on critical issues. These are all reason why I argue 
the board did not fulfill their duty to monitor management. If they had fulfilled their 
responsibilities, the fraud could have been prevented or detected at an earlier point. The CEO 
was given freedom to act, direct and control the company as he wanted although this is the 
duty of the board.  
 
The board in K&K seems to have acted as a rubber stamp on the CEO’s decisions as he seems 
to have had considerable control over the board. The lack of business and financial 
competence meant that the directors did not have the ability to analyze financial statement 
numbers and ask critical questions. Moreover, they were more concerned with growth and the 
top line than the liquidity and solidity of the firm. This made the owners lose their ability to 
monitor the company’s activities and financial position. It is also censurable that no actions 
were taken to improve the company’s high capital bindings until 2011, even though this was 
repeatedly discussed in meetings. The general follow up of board decisions were lacking 
throughout the whole period. As the board’s control function was weak, management had 
both the opportunity and possibility to manipulate the financial reports.  
  





The aim of this paper is to explain the factors in the environment that allows earnings 
management and fraud to occur in a company, by using the case of Kraft & Kultur. The case 
analysis shows how conditions in the company and environment enabled central management 
to manipulate financial statements over many years. First of all, the complexity and 
uncertainty concerning revenue provided an opportunity for management to manage earnings, 
as revenue relating to yearend sales had to be estimated. Hence, the risk of misstatements due 
to errors and fraud is significant in the power industry. Secondly, weak internal controls and 
poor monitoring from the board made the fraud possible. Thirdly, the desire to cover up a lack 
of control might have been the motivation behind the fraud. 
 
The CEO had a strong and visionary personality, and he exercised a great deal of power and 
influence over the board as well as other members of the company. The CEO was responsible 
for the preparation of accounts as well as all communication and with the auditor. This is a 
key explanation to how the fraud could occur. By inflating the size of accrued income, he 
managed to show incredible growth levels each year. Moreover, the circumstances indicate 
that the CEO deliberately failed to record costs relating to the purchase of power, as 
employees failed to hedge prices on fixed price contracts. This could have been an attempt to 
increase earnings by speculating that prices would fall. However, when prices increased 
management seem to have activated these costs on the balance sheet instead.  
 
The board is to be blamed that appropriate controls were not implemented in the company, as 
stronger internal controls would have limited management’s possibility of fraudulent 
reporting. Most importantly, the board should have ensured that a CFO was hired at an earlier 
point. The board also failed to make sure that financial statements was accurate and reflected 
the real financial position of the company, as they did not react to red flags and 
inconsistencies in the financial statements, even though they had the necessary competence to 
do so from 2008. Consequently, the circumstances indicate that the board should have 
detected the misstatements at an earlier stage.  
 
Moreover, the quality of the audit performed by Grant Thornton can be questioned as the 
auditors failed to obtain sufficient evidence and assurance concerning the existence of the 
accrued revenue.  
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